A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 2Lea, Henry Charles
History
A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 2
Lea, Henry Charles
Inquisition -- Spain
It is satisfactory to be able to say that, as a rule, the interference
of the Suprema with the tribunals was on the side of mercy rather than
of rigor. It is true that torture, then the universal solvent of doubt,
was frequently ordered, but there seems to have been a fairly
conscientious discharge of the responsibilities which it had grasped.
In the Valladolid records of the seventeenth century, the modifications
of sentences are almost uniformly mitigations, especially by the
omission of scourging, which the tribunals were accustomed to administer
liberally, and there would seem to be especial tenderness for the
offences of the clergy.[488] A typical instance of this moderation is
seen in the case of Margarita Altamira, sentenced by the Barcelona
tribunal, in 1682, to appear in an auto de fe, to abjure de levi, to
receive a hundred lashes through the streets and to seven years' exile
from Barcelona and some other places, the first two of which were to be
passed serving in a hospital without pay. All this the Suprema reduced
to hearing her sentence read in the audience-chamber and to four years'
exile from the same places.[489] This mitigating tendency is especially
apparent in the restored Inquisition, from 1814 to 1820, where the
sentences are almost uniformly revised with a reduction of penalties.
Scourging is more rarely prescribed by the tribunals and, when it is
ordered, it is invariably omitted by the Suprema, the power of
dispensing with it being attributed to the inquisitor-general.[490]
* * * * *
As the functions of the tribunals thus gradually shrank to mere
ministerial duties, the appellate jurisdiction lodged in the
inquisitor-general and absorbed by the Suprema, of which we heard so
much in earlier times, became less and less important. The bull of Leo
X, in 1516, prescribes that appeals shall be heard by the
inquisitor-general in conjunction with the Suprema and that, pending the
decision, the case shall be suspended.[491] This indicates that appeals
were suspensive, although subsequently the Inquisition eluded this by
arguing, as in the matter of Villanueva, that they were merely
devolutionary--that is, that sentences, in spite of them, were to be
promptly executed, thus practically rendering them useless.[492]
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