This last case is perhaps explicable by Jesuit influence, for he was of the family of St. Ignatius, and further reparation was made by creating his brother, Don Ignacio de Loyola y Haro alguazil mayor of the tribunal, while three nephews were made familiars.[288] The reluctance of the tribunals to pronounce a sentence of acquittal is illustrated in the case of Francisco Marco, tried at Barcelona for bigamy, in 1718. Unable to prove the charge, which was punishable with scourging and galleys, the tribunal sentenced him to have his sentence _con meritos_ read in the audience-chamber, to be reprimanded and threatened, and to be banished from Barcelona and Madrid for six years. In the earlier period this sentence would have stood, but by this time the Suprema was in full control and it expressed great surprise at so unjust a decision, inflicting so foul a stigma on the accused. It declared null and void all the acts of the process, it ordered Marco to be discharged at once, and that the inquisitors should defray out of their salaries all the cost of his imprisonment.[289] [Sidenote: _SUSPENSION_] The indisposition to acquit found expression in the device known as suspension. When the effort to convict failed, the case could be suspended, thus leaving matters as they stood; the accused was neither acquitted nor convicted, the case could at any moment be reopened and prosecuted to the end, and it hung over the unfortunate victim while it saved the infallibility of the tribunal. The earliest allusion to it that I have met occurs in the Instructions of 1498, which show that it was a usage already established and abused, for it is forbidden in prosecutions of the dead, except when further evidence is expected, and acquittal is ordered when the proof is imperfect, because there are many cases of suspension that inflict hardship through the sequestrations continuing in force.[290]