In fact, the so-called advocate was simply an official instrument for securing confession and conviction, for which his ostensible position of friendly adviser gave him peculiar opportunity. No communication between him and his client was allowed, except in presence of the inquisitors and of the secretary, who made record of all that passed between them, thus keeping watch to see that he performed his duty. It is true that he was sworn to defend the prisoner with all care and diligence and fidelity, if there was ground for it, and if not to undeceive him, but his real duty is described as urging the prisoner to confess fully as to himself and others, and to throw himself upon the mercy of the tribunal, for by denial he would only prejudice his case and suffer in the end.[128] How any deviation from this was treated, appears in the case of Benito Ferrer, in 1621, before the Toledo tribunal. In the consultation, his advocate Argendona suggested some points of defence displeasing to the inquisitors, who promptly ordered him out of the audience-chamber and sent Benito back to his cell to refresh his memory and discharge his conscience, and two days later Argendona had to put in the written defence without further opportunity of conference. The Licentiate Egas had a more accurate conception of his duty, when serving as advocate for Isabel Reynier, tried, in 1571, for Protestantism in Toledo. The official record states that, after unavailing efforts to induce her to confess, he asked whether she had any enemies to disable, on which he could frame a defence, when she named several, but, as the Señores Inquisidores wanted to despatch the case, he told her that this would avail her nothing, for there was no presumption that enmity had caused false-witness, and he went on to persuade her that she had already confessed enough to render her case hopeless. The impatience of the inquisitors was gratified, for the unfortunate woman was sent to the stake without Egas troubling them by putting in a written defence.[129] The old rule remained in force forbidding the advocate to defend an impenitent heretic. It made no difference of course in the result, but still permission to do so would have saved appearances. Such cases occasionally occurred, like that of Benito Peñas at Toledo in 1641, a harmless lunatic with some vague speculative heresies. His advocate, Juan Díaz Suelto, after a conference in which his client obstinately rejected his advice to forsake his errors and beg for mercy, reported that his efforts had been in vain, so that it was necessary for him to abandon the defence, in order not to incur the censures and other penalties imposed by the papal briefs, and also for the speedier despatch of the case.[130] Even as late as 1753, at Valencia, the same occurred in the trial of a swindling German named Horstmann.[131] [Sidenote: _PROCURATORS NOT ADMITTED_]