Besides the advocate there appears in many trials a personage known as the _curador_, or guardian, a living evidence of the fatherly care of the Inquisition toward the helpless. Following the traditions of the Roman law, Spanish jurisprudence provided that, in suits and actions involving those who had not attained the full age of twenty-five years, the assent of a curador, either permanent or temporary _ad hoc_, was necessary to validate the legal acts of the minor.[140] This provision, intended for the protection of the youthful and incapable, was retained in the practice of the Inquisition, because it was necessary to render valid the various compulsory acts of the accused in the successive steps of his trial, but in order that it might not by any chance be of value to him, and to preserve the secrecy of the Holy Office, the custom was adopted of appointing the advocate or preferably the gaoler, or messenger, or some other underling of the tribunal to serve as curador. As it was thus wholly subversive of the object for which the function was created, there is grotesque cynicism in the pompous formalities through which the curador was interjected into the proceedings. He took a solemn oath that he would diligently and faithfully defend his ward, alleging all that was to his advantage and preventing all that was injurious, advising with his advocate and doing all that a good guardian could do for a ward. And, if the latter, through his negligence, suffered injury, he pledged his person and property to make it good, giving as security another person (a fellow subordinate) who united with him in the liability, jointly and severally, renouncing all legal defence and placing themselves and all their possessions in the hands of the inquisitors.[141] Being thus a mere formality, or rather a deception, involving the perjury of those who took the formidable oath, it may be dismissed from further consideration, except to cite a case illustrative of the rigid formalism of procedure. In 1638, at Valladolid, Blanca Enríquez, on trial for Judaism, represented herself as twenty-two years of age and as usual was given a curador. She confessed to having been reconciled at Córdova, nine or ten years before; a vote in discordia carried the case to the Suprema, which discovered that her previous trial had occurred in 1623, when she was fifteen and consequently she was now thirty. The curador therefore had rendered the trial irregular, and the Suprema ordered it to be repeated from the beginning.[142]