The endeavor to lay down rules for guidance as to this led to an infinity of instructions, more or less rigid or lax. In 1498, the Suprema called attention to the evils that had hitherto followed publication, wherefore in future care must be taken to omit all circumstances giving a clue to the identity of the witnesses, and this was repeated in 1499.[147] Yet the glaring injustice of withholding from the accused a knowledge of details that might enable him to disprove the charges was recognized, but all instructions forbidding this were framed with an "if" that virtually authorized the wrong. For instance, the specification of time and place at which an act was said to have been performed was indispensable, if the accused were to have a chance of detecting false swearing, yet such details might possibly lead him to identify the witness, and these opposing reasons gave rise to a series of varying orders which indicate how the Suprema vacillated between the desire to secure the advantage and the consciousness of the wrong. In 1525 it condemned the practice of the Toledo tribunal in omitting time and place. It was difficult to make the inquisitors observe this and, in 1527, a general order was issued to state the evidence as the witnesses had given it, neither more nor less. In 1530 it made a concession by ordering that it should be consulted when there was "inconvenience" in stating the month or year. Then, in 1532, it laid down the positive rule that place and time and persons must be stated, for the principle that the witness must be protected was to be construed as preventing only direct recognition and not inferential. This was again modified, in 1537, when, while again ordering that all the evidence must be given, this was qualified by the old injunction to suppress all circumstances by which the witnesses could be identified. About 1560, some instructions to Barcelona order that the time should be stated, while place is to be indicated in such general terms as shall not betray the witness. Finally, in the definitive Instructions of 1561, time and place are ordered to be given, but at the same the omission is prescribed of all that may betray the witness. A caution that no evidence is to be used that is not in the publication gives a hint of other irregularities of even a more serious nature.[148] The publication being a matter of supreme importance, it was the duty of the inquisitors personally to draw it up, and not entrust it to subordinates, least of all to the fiscal, who was technically the prosecutor. Orders to this effect were issued in 1529; they were repeated in the Instructions of 1561 but, in 1568, the Suprema was obliged to take the Barcelona tribunal to task for allowing the fiscal to do it, and a later writer informs us that inquisitors continued to shirk the labor and threw it upon the secretaries.[149]