Recusation of a judge was a right recognized in the traditional legislation of Spain.[156] It was admitted in the Inquisition and we have seen, in the cases of Carranza and Villanueva, how little the accused profited thereby, even when nominally successful. It was a recourse practically open only to the powerful or to the trained, at best but a dangerous expedient, and of necessity had to be done at the commencement of a trial. It evidently was not employed often enough for a definite form of procedure to have been provided. The Instructions of 1561 require that, if an inquisitor be recused, he must abandon the case to his colleague; if he has none, or if both are recused, the matter must await the decision of the Suprema.[157] This would indicate that the recused judge retired as a matter of course, but the Carranza and Villanueva cases prove that the objections of the prisoner had to be demonstrated as legitimate and this is further indicated when the troublesome Jesuit, Padre Juan Bautista Poza's extravagant Mariolatry was condemned at Rome and approved in Spain. It took seven years after his _Elucidarium Deiparæ_ had been placed on the Roman Index, in 1628, before the Spanish Inquisition could be compelled by the nuncio to prosecute him for his rebellious defiance. When on trial by the Toledo tribunal, he recused the Inquisitor Cienfuegos; his reasons were examined by the Suprema, which consulted the other inquisitors and the recusation was sustained. How unusual was this proceeding is indicated by the boast of his triumphant brethren that this was one of the remarkable events that had occurred in Spain.[158] Yet an incident in the trial of Fray Luis de Leon shows the advantage taken of any obstacle to prevent recusation. After two and a half years of seclusion in prison from the world, he asked to know the names of the existing inquisitor-general and members of the Suprema, in order that he might recuse any whom he regarded as inimical, yet this elementary piece of information was denied, in spite of repeated applications, in which his counsel joined, showing that the latter was debarred from telling him what was of public notoriety.[159] Strictly speaking, recusation was not a defence but merely a preliminary to it, and its rarity renders it of minor importance. Of the pleas in abatement enumerated by Simancas, that of youth amounted to little for, as we have seen, as soon as the age of responsibility was reached, the offender was liable to punishment, and there was little mercy shown. In fact, there was a device, when the culprit was below the age of fourteen, of postponing the sentence until he had attained that age.[160] [Sidenote: THE DEFENCE--INSANITY]