A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
armed and told off into new regiments. There was every probability
that in a few days the movement would spread northward over the Sierra
Morena into La Mancha. An insurrection in this district would sever
Dupont’s communications with Madrid, for he had not left behind him any
sufficient detachments to guard the defiles which he had just passed,
or to keep open the great post-road to the capital across the plains of
New Castile. When he started he had been under the impression that it
was only local troubles in Andalusia that he had to suppress.
Dupont was already beginning to find that the insurgents were in much
greater numbers than he had expected when he crossed the Sierra Morena,
but till he had made trial of their strength he considered that it
would be wrong to halt. He had close before him the great city of
Cordova, a most tempting prize, and he resolved to push on at least so
far before taking it upon himself to halt and ask for reinforcements.
His continued movement soon brought about the first engagement of the
war, as at the bridge of Alcolea he found his advance disputed by a
considerable hostile force [June 7].
The military commandant of the district of Cordova was a certain Don
Pedro de Echávarri, a retired colonel whom the local Junta had just
placed in command of its levies. His force consisted of 10,000 or
12,000 peasants and citizens, who had only received their arms three
days before, and had not yet been completely told off into regiments
and companies. On the 4th of June he had been sent a small body of
old troops--one battalion of light infantry (Campo Mayor), and one
of militia (the 3rd Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia)--1,400 men
in all, and with them eight guns. To have abandoned Cordova without
a fight would have discouraged the new levies, and probably have led
to Echávarri’s own death; for the armed mob which he commanded would
have torn him to pieces as a traitor if he had refused to give battle.
Accordingly he resolved to defend the passage of the Guadalquivir
at the point where the high-road from Andujar crossed it, six miles
outside Cordova. He barricaded the bridge and placed his guns and the
two old battalions on the hither side of the river, in a position
commanding the defile. On each flank of them some thousands of the
Cordovan insurgents were drawn up, while the remainder of the levy,
including all the mounted men, were sent across the bridge, and hidden
in some hills which overhung the road by which the French were coming.
They were ordered to show themselves, and to threaten to fall upon the
enemy from the flank, when he should have developed his attack upon
the bridge. If Echávarri had been guided by military considerations he
would not have dared to offer battle with such a raw and motley force
to 12,000 French troops--even if the latter were but the conscripts of
Dupont. But political necessity compelled him to make the attempt.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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