A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
A vigorous pursuit might have done much further harm to the defeated
Spaniards; but Bessières’ men had been marching since two in the
morning, and fighting all through the mid-day. They were much fatigued,
and their commander did not press the chase far beyond the river.
But the town of Rio Seco was sacked from cellar to garret, with much
slaying of non-combatants and outrages of all kinds[139], a fact very
discreditable to the marshal, who could have stopped the plunder had he
chosen.
[139] When Stuart and Vaughan passed through Medina in September,
they were given many harrowing details by the local authorities.
The defeated generals met, a little to the west of the battle-field,
and after a bitter altercation, in which Blake used the plainest words
about Cuesta’s generalship, parted in wrath. The Galicians retired by
the way they had come, and joined the division which had been left
behind three days before; they then went back to the passes above
Astorga, abandoning a considerable amount of stores at Benavente.
Cuesta took the army of Castile to Leon, retiring on the Asturias
rather than on Galicia.
Bessières’ well-earned victory was creditable to himself and his
troops, but the way had been made easy for him by the astounding
tactical errors of the Captain-General of Castile. The rank and file of
the Spanish army had no reason to be ashamed of their conduct: it was
their commander who should have blushed at the reckless way in which he
had sacrificed his willing troops. Handled by Cuesta the best army in
the world might have been defeated by inferior numbers.
The strategical results of the battle of Rio Seco were great and
far-reaching. All danger of the cutting of the communications between
Madrid and Bayonne was averted, and Napoleon, his mind set at rest
on this point, could now assert that Dupont’s position in Andalusia
was henceforth the only hazardous point in his great scheme of
invasion[140]. It would clearly be a very long time before the army of
Galicia would again dare to take the offensive, and meanwhile Madrid
was safe, and the attempt to conquer Southern Spain could be resumed
without any fear of interruption. Bessières, after such a victory,
was strong enough not to require any further reinforcements from the
central reserve in and about the capital.
[140] See his remarks in the document of July 21, _Nap.
Corresp._, 14,223.
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