A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
With 16,000 or 17,000 men, including nearly 3,500 cavalry, Dupont
ought to have been able to contain Castaños, if not to beat him.
The proportion of his forces to those of the enemy was not much
less than that which Bessières had possessed at Medina de Rio Seco.
But, unfortunately for himself and his master, Dupont was far from
possessing the boldness and the skill of the marshal. By assuming not
a vigorous offensive but a timid defensive along a protracted front,
he threw away his chances. The line which he had resolved to hold was
that of the Upper Guadalquivir, from Andujar to the next passage up
the river, the ferry of Mengibar, eight miles from Baylen. This gave a
front of some fifteen miles to hold: but unfortunately even when drawn
out to this length the two divisions of Barbou and Vedel did not cover
all the possible lines of attack which Castaños might adopt. He might
still march past them and cut them off from the defiles of the Morena,
by going a little higher up the river and crossing it near Baeza and
Ubeda. Dupont was wrong to take this line of defence at all: unless he
was prepared to attack the army of Andalusia in the open, he should
have retired to Baylen or to La Carolina, where he would have been able
to cover the passes for as long as he might choose, since he could not
have had either of his flanks turned.
Meanwhile he was gratified to hear that further reinforcements were
being sent to him. Unreasonably disquieted about Andalusia, as Napoleon
thought, Savary proceeded to send a third division to aid Dupont. This
was Gobert’s, the second of Moncey’s corps: it started from Madrid
not quite complete, and left strong detachments at the more important
towns along the road through La Mancha. Though originally seventeen
battalions strong, it reached the northern slope of the Sierra Morena
with only ten. Savary had not intended it to go any further: he had
told Dupont that it was to be used to cover his retreat, if a retreat
became necessary, but not for active operations in Andalusia. But
disregarding these directions Dupont commanded Gobert to cross the
Morena and come down to join Vedel: this he did, bringing with him
nine ‘provisional battalions[142]’ and the second provisional regiment
of cuirassiers, perhaps 5,000 men in all. There were now over 20,000
French on the south side of the mountain, a force amply sufficient to
deal with Castaños and his 33,000 Andalusians [July 7]. But they were
still widely scattered. Dupont lay at Andujar with 9,000 or 10,000
sabres and bayonets: Vedel was sixteen miles away at Baylen, with 6,000
men, of whom 2,000 under General Liger-Belair were pushed forward to
the ferry of Mengibar. Gobert was at La Carolina, at the foot of the
passes, with five battalions about him, and a sixth encamped on the
summit of the defile. He had sent forward the remainder of his division
(the four battalions of the sixth provisional regiment, and half the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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