Having passed the Tagus they might cut their way through the insurgents of the Alemtejo, disperse the Spanish levies about Elvas and Badajoz, and press north through Estremadura to join Bessières[242]. This very idea did for a moment flash through the brains of some of Junot’s council of war at Torres Vedras: but there lay on their minds, like a nightmare, the remembrance of their awful march through the Estremaduran mountains in the preceding autumn. If, journeying unopposed from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, they had been nearly starved in that wilderness, what would be their fate if they had to cut their way through an insurrection, with the English army hanging on their heels? The most hopeful could only say that perhaps half the army might struggle through to Old Castile. [239] This figure, of course, does not include the garrisons of the outlying places, but only those immediately in and about the capital, after the 66th and _compagnies d’élite_ marched to Torres Vedras. [240] Hulot, _Mémoires Militaires_, p. 236. [241] Questions asked of Wellesley by Burrard at the Court of Inquiry (_Proceedings_, p. 133). [242] Wellesley to Mr. Stuart, Aug. 25, 1808 (_Well. Disp._, iv. 105); Wellesley’s address at the Court of Inquiry (_Proceedings_, p. 132). Wellesley’s arguments to Dalrymple had no further effect than to induce that general to make up his mind that the troops should march not on the twenty-second but on the twenty-third, and not on Mafra but on Torres Vedras. Sir John Moore’s division was to be brought down at once to Maceira Bay, to join the main army, and not to be sent (as Wellesley had urged) to Santarem. With the aid of this reinforcement Dalrymple hoped to be strong enough to force back Junot into Lisbon. The resolve meant fatal delay: Moore did not begin to disembark till August 25, and his last men did not get ashore till August 30. On that day only could Junot have been attacked seriously, and meanwhile he would have obtained nine days in which to fortify his positions and to place Lisbon in a thorough state of defence. The consequences entailed would have been a long siege, the probable devastation of the Portuguese capital, and the protraction of operations into November and December. Even then there would still have been Elvas and Almeida to be recaptured[243]. [243] This is Wellesley’s own view (_Well. Disp._, iv. 121, 184, 185).