real fighting-force that they possessed was, he said, the army of Castaños: the rest, with the possible exception of Blake’s Galicians, were ‘armies of peasantry,’ which could not be relied upon to meet the French in the field. Though they might on some occasions fight with success in their own mountains, ‘yet in others a thousand French with cavalry and artillery will disperse thousands of them.’ They would not, and indeed could not, leave their native provinces, and no officer could calculate upon them for the carrying out of a great combined operation. How then could the British army of Portugal be best employed to aid such allies? The only efficient plan, Wellesley concludes, would be to place it upon the flank and rear of any French advance to Madrid, by moving it up to the valley of the Douro, and basing it upon Asturias and Galicia. Posted in the kingdom of Leon, with its ports of supply at Gihon, Corunna, and Ferrol, it should co-operate with Blake, and hang upon the right flank of the French army which was forming upon the line of the Ebro. The result would be to prevent the invaders from moving forward, even perhaps (here Wellesley erred from ignorance of the enemy’s numbers) to oblige them to retire towards their own frontier. But Bonaparte could, unless occupied by the affairs of Central Europe, increase his armies in Spain to any extent. The moment that he heard of an English force in the field, he would consider its destruction as his first object, and so multiply his numbers in the Peninsula that the British commander would have to give back. ‘There must be a line of retreat open, and that retreat must be the sea.’ Accordingly, Sir Arthur recommended that the Asturias should be made the ultimate base, and the transports and stores sent to its port of Gihon[278]. [274] Wellesley to the Bishop of Oporto, Sept. 6: ‘I was present during the negotiation of the agreement, and by the desire of the Commander-in-chief I signed it. But I did not negotiate it, nor can I in any manner be considered responsible for its contents’ (_Well. Disp._, iv. 134). Wellesley to Castlereagh, Oct. 6: ‘I do not consider myself responsible in any degree for the terms in which it was framed, or for any of its provisions.’ [275] Wellesley to Mr. Stuart (_Well. Disp._, iv. 120). To Lord Castlereagh (iv. 118). To the Duke of Richmond (_Suppl. Disp._, vi. 129). [276] Wellesley to Dalrymple _(Well. Disp._, iv. 138). [277] Wellesley to Moore, Sept. 17, 1808 (_Well. Disp._, p. 142). Moore, as a noted Whig, was imagined not to be a _persona grata_ at head quarters; Wellesley offers, in the most handsome way, to endeavour to smooth matters for him.