A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
armistice, though it bore Wellesley’s name, had not been drawn up or
approved in detail by him. Of the numerous minor witnesses who were
examined, all who had served at Roliça and Vimiero spoke on Wellesley’s
side: Spencer and Ferguson were especially strong in their statements.
The fact was that they were intensely proud of their two fights, and
looked upon Burrard as the man who had prevented them from entering
Lisbon in triumph after capturing Junot and his whole host. So strong
was this feeling that the brigadiers and field-officers of the eight
brigades that fought at Vimiero had presented Wellesley with a handsome
testimonial--a service of plate worth £1,000--as a sort of mark of
confidence in him, and of protest against those who had stayed his hand.
[284] Lockhart’s _Life of Sir Walter Scott_, ii. 226.
On the other hand, Burrard and Dalrymple urged all the justifications
of caution. Each had arrived at a crisis, the details of which could
not be properly known to him from sheer want of time to master them.
Each acknowledged that Wellesley had vehemently pressed him to strike
boldly and promptly, but thought that he had not been justified in
doing so till he had made out for himself the exact situation of
affairs. Burrard pleaded that Junot might have possessed reserves
unknown to him, which might have changed the fortune of the fight
if a headlong pursuit had been ordered. Wellesley had told him that
none such existed (and this turned out to have been the fact), but he
himself had not seen any clear proof of it at the time[285]. Dalrymple
went even further, and stated that he had considered the whole conduct
of the campaign, from the landing in Mondego Bay till the battle of
Vimiero, terribly rash[286]. If he had permitted the army to march on
Mafra on the twenty-second, the French from Torres Vedras might have
taken him in the flank as he passed through a very difficult country,
and the most disastrous results might have ensued. He was positive
that nothing hazardous ought to have been attempted, and that it was
necessary to wait for Sir John Moore’s division before pressing the
French to extremity.
[285] Burrard before the Court of Inquiry (_Proceedings_, pp.
115, 116, 135).
[286] Dalrymple before the Court of Inquiry (_Well. Disp._, iv.
178, 180, 181).
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