A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
For the first six weeks of the war in Catalonia Duhesme and Reille had
been opposed only by the gallant _somatenes_. Of the handful of regular
troops who had been stationed in the principality when the insurrection
broke out, the greater part had drifted off to the siege of Saragossa,
or to the struggle in the south. Only the Irish regiment at Gerona,
and certain fragments of the disbanded battalions of the Guards from
Barcelona had aided the peasantry in resisting the invader. The success
of the Catalans, in hemming in Duhesme and checking Reille’s advance,
is all the more notable when we reflect that their levies had not been
guided by any central organization, nor placed under the command of any
single general. The Junta at Lerida had done little more than issue
proclamations and serve out to the _somatenes_ the moderate amount
of munitions of war that was at its disposition. It had indeed drawn
out a scheme for the raising of a provincial army--forty _tercios_ of
_miqueletes_, each 1,000 strong, were to be levied and kept permanently
in the field. But this scheme existed only on paper, and there were
no means of officering or arming such a mass of men. Even as late as
August 1, there were only 6,000 of them embodied in organized corps:
the mass of the men of military age were still at their own firesides,
prepared to turn out at the sound of the _somaten_, whenever a French
column appeared in their neighbourhood, but not ready to keep the field
for more than a few days, or to transfer their service to the more
distant regions of the principality. The direction of these irregular
bands was still in the hands of local leaders like Claros, Milans, and
Baget, who aided each other in a sufficiently loyal fashion when they
had the chance, but did not obey any single commander-in-chief, or act
on any settled military plan. Their successes had been due to their
own untutored intelligence and courage, not to the carrying out of any
regular policy.
This period of patriotic anarchy was now drawing to an end; regular
troops were beginning to appear on the scene in considerable numbers,
and the direction of the military resources of Catalonia was about to
be confided to their generals. The change was not all for the better:
during the whole struggle the Spaniards showed themselves admirable
insurgents but indifferent soldiers. After one more short but brilliant
period of success, the balance of fortune was about to turn against
the Catalans, and a long series of disasters was to try, but never to
subdue, their indomitable and persevering courage.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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