their baggage,’ and (of course) ‘a machination paid for with English gold[328]. These imbeciles are to suffer on the scaffold the penalty of this great national crime[329].’ The Emperor did well to be angry, for the shock of Baylen was indeed felt to every end of Europe. But he should have blamed his own Macchiavellian brain, that conceived the plot of Bayonne, and his own overweening confidence, that launched Dupont with 20,000 half-trained conscripts (not, as he wrote to Clarke, with _vingt mille hommes d’élite et choisis_) on the hazardous Andalusian enterprise. [324] Napoleon to Jerome, King of Westphalia, July 25 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,230): ‘L’Autriche arme: elle nie ses armements, elle arme donc contre nous.... Puisque l’Autriche arme, il faut donc armer. Aussi j’ordonne que la Grande Armée soit renforcée. Mes troupes se réunissent à Strasbourg, Mayence, Wesel,’ &c. Compare this with the great harangue made to Metternich on August 15 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,254) and with _Nap. Corresp._, 14,248, which discusses the co-operation of Russia in a war with Austria. [325] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 3 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,242). [326] i.e. Napoleon is aware that they will never allow the army to be taken home by sea, as the capitulation provided. [327] Napoleon to Joseph, Aug. 3 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,243): ‘L’Allemagne, l’Italie, la Pologne etc., tout se lie,’ is the Emperor’s phrase. [328] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,244, 14,272, 14,283. [329] A few words as to Dupont’s fate may be added. His experiences during the next four years throw a curious light on the administration of military justice under the Empire. He, together with Vedel, Chabert, Marescot, Legendre, and the aide-de-camp Villoutreys, were arrested on returning to France, and thrown into prison. They were told to prepare for a trial before the Supreme High Court (_Haute Cour Impériale_), and a long series of interrogatories was administered to them. A military commission drew up a preliminary report on the case: on reading it the Emperor saw that Dupont had a fair defence to make on all the charges brought against him, with the exception of that of military incapacity. He countermanded the order for a trial, and the prisoners (after nine months of confinement) were released, but left under police surveillance. After Dupont had spent two years and a half of peace in the country-house of a relative, he was suddenly arrested at midnight on Feb. 12, 1812, and given a secret trial, not before a court of justice or a court-martial, but before a special military commission. He was allowed neither counsel nor documents, and forced to defend himself at forty-eight hours’ notice. The judges declared him guilty of having signed a capitulation containing ‘des conditions honteuses et avilissantes,’ but not of having surrendered without necessity, or of having shown cowardice or treason. Since the