[331] Viz. Musnier’s division of Moncey’s corps 6,500 men Frere’s division of Dupont’s corps 4,400 ” Bujet’s brigade of Morlot’s division of Moncey’s corps 3,700 ” Remains (5 batts.) of Gobert’s division of Moncey’s corps 2,500 ” Rey’s brigade of infantry (Joseph’s escort) 2,000 ” Infantry and Cavalry of the Imperial Guard 2,500 ” Cavalry of the Line 1,700 ” ------ 23,300 ” [332] Lefebvre’s brigade, which belonged to Morlot’s division of Moncey’s corps--it had been lent to Bessières for the moment--and Reynaud’s brigade, i.e. 5,300 foot, also two cavalry regiments, making 6,000 in all. [333] Bazancourt’s brigade of two veteran regiments (14th and 44th of the line), the last that had arrived at Saragossa. But all these arrangements were futile. Bonaparte at Bordeaux was separated from his brother at the Retiro by so many miles that his orders were grown stale before they reached their destination. His scheme was made out on August 2, but on the preceding day King Joseph and his whole army had evacuated Madrid. The terror of Baylen was upon them, and they were expecting every moment to find themselves attacked by Castaños, who was as a matter of fact celebrating triumphal feasts at Seville. With a haste that turned out to be altogether unnecessary, Moncey’s corps, escorting the King, his court, and his long train of Spanish refugees, crossed the Somosierra and did not halt till they reached Aranda de Duero, in the plains of Old Castile. Napoleon was forced to make other plans in view of this retreat, whose moral consequences were hardly inferior in importance to those of Dupont’s capitulation. For both the Spanish nation and the courts of Europe looked upon the evacuation of Madrid as marking the complete downfall of Napoleon’s policy, and portending a speedy retirement of the invaders behind the Pyrenees. It is certain that if the spirit of Joseph and his advisers had been unbroken, they might have clung to the capital till the reinforcements which the Emperor was hurrying to their aid had arrived. It is probable that the 35,000 men, of whom Savary and Moncey could then have disposed, might have held Castaños in check till the army from the Rhine had time to come up. Yet there is every excuse for the behaviour of the French commanders, for they could not possibly have known that the Spaniards would move with such astonishing slowness, or that they would refrain from hurling every available man on Madrid. And as a matter of fact the evacuation of the capital turned out in the end to be advantageous to Napoleon, for it inspired his adversaries with a foolish self-confidence which proved their ruin. If they had been forced to fight hard in New Castile, they would have been