Much of what the Duke of Belluno wrote was true: in particular, the idea of co-operation with Soult was perfectly chimerical: Napoleon had worked out all his logistics to an erroneous result, from want of a real conception of the conditions and difficulties of war in the Peninsula. But some of the pleas which Victor urged merely serve to show his disinclination to accept the task which had been set him; and in especial he underrated the numbers of his troops beyond the limit of fair statement. He had with him nine battalions of Ruffin’s division, twelve of Villatte’s, eight of Leval’s; of cavalry he had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, three of Lasalle’s light cavalry[165], two regiments of his own corps-cavalry, and the Westphalian regiment of the 4th Corps which was attached to Leval’s Germans. The total must have amounted to 15,000 infantry, and about 5,500 cavalry: he had also sixty guns with 1,600 artillerymen[166]. [165] 26th and 10th Chasseurs and 9th Dragoons; the fourth regiment, the Polish lancers, was with Sebastiani (see pp. 146-7). [166] The February figures for Victor’s men _présents sous les armes_ are:-- 1st Division, Ruffin 5,429 3rd Division, Villatte 6,376 German Division [deducting one battalion] 3,127 Corps-cavalry [two regiments] 1,386 Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons 2,527 Lasalle’s three regiments 1,121 Westphalian _Chevaux-Légers_ 487 Artillery of 1st Corps 1,523 Leval’s artillery (two batteries) 184 ------ Total 22,160 In spite of his reluctance Victor was forced to yield to the pressure of Jourdan and the Emperor’s explicit orders. On March 14 he began to make his preparations to cross the Tagus and to attack Cuesta: it was reported to him that the roads starting from the two bridges which were in his power, those of Talavera and Arzobispo, were neither of them practicable for artillery, and that only the route by Almaraz was suitable for the guns and heavy baggage. But the bridge of Almaraz was broken, and beyond it were visible entrenchments thrown up by the Spaniards, and a considerable body of troops--the division of General Henestrosa. The Duke of Belluno determined to clear the way for a crossing at Almaraz, by sending infantry across the Tagus by the passages higher up-stream, with orders to sweep the southern bank till they came opposite to the broken bridge. They were to dislodge the force behind it, and then the artillery, the baggage, and cavalry were to cross on a bridge of rafts, which was being prepared close to Almaraz, in order to be ready the moment that it should be wanted.