individual soldiery of the two armies, Cuesta’s behaviour was that of a criminal lunatic. We shall see that his tactics were as bad as his strategy. [174] The Spanish statements that Cuesta had only 2,200 horse seem disproved by a letter from Cuesta’s camp, Col. D’Urban to Cradock (April 7), to the effect that Cuesta had already rallied, after Medellin, fully 3,000 horse, but only 6,000 or 7,000 foot [Record Office]. The Marshal had left the two Dutch battalions of Leval’s division at Truxillo, in charge of his sick: he dropped the 1st Dragoons of Latour-Maubourg’s division at Miajadas, to guard the cross-roads, and sent out the 4th and 9th from the same division along the upper Guadiana, where they soon learnt of Cuesta’s presence on the other side of the river. Lasalle’s light horse rode down to Merida, and occupied the old Roman capital of western Spain without having to strike a blow. Learning that the Spaniards had not retreated in this direction, but by the eastern road, the Marshal (as Cuesta had supposed likely) directed the bulk of his infantry on Medellin; only the division of Ruffin remained behind, at the cross-roads of Miajadas. Meanwhile Cuesta had evacuated Medellin, and fallen back to La Serena, where Albuquerque joined him on the twenty-seventh. The moment that the army was united, he turned back, and retraced his steps towards his former position. On the twenty-eighth he reached the town of Don Benito, only five miles from Medellin, and learnt to his great pleasure that Victor was before him and quite ready to fight. The Marshal had swept the whole country-side with his numerous cavalry during the last four days, and discovering that there was no Spanish force opposite him in any direction save that of La Serena, had ordered Lasalle and Ruffin to march up and join him from Merida and Miajadas. On the morning of the twenty-ninth he had his entire army united, save the two Dutch battalions left at Truxillo, two more of Leval’s battalions left at Merida[175], the 1st Dragoons at Miajadas, and one other cavalry regiment which had been told off to guard the bridge of Almaraz. He cannot have had less than 13,000 infantry and 4,500 horse, even when allowance is made for the sick and the losses at Meza de Ibor and Miajadas. Cuesta outnumbered him by 6,000 infantry, but was overmatched in cavalry by more than three to two, since he had but 3,000 sabres, and even more hopelessly in artillery, since Victor had brought over fifty guns to the field, while he had only thirty. [175] Frankfort and the 1st of Hesse. See Sausez’s _Régiment de Francfort_, p. 30.