A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The Duke of Belluno had been ordered by the Emperor to beat the Army
of Estremadura, and then to get into touch with Soult, who should
have been due at Lisbon long ere this. But no news of the 2nd Corps
had come to hand: it was known to have penetrated into northern
Portugal, but its exact position could not be learnt. Victor,
refusing to move till he had news of his colleague, cantoned his
army at Merida and Medellin, and put the old castles of both these
places, as well as that of Truxillo, in a state of defence. He would
probably have done well to utilize the time of necessary waiting in
laying siege to Badajoz. But he contented himself with watching that
fortress and observing the reorganized army of Cuesta, which had
now grown once more to a respectable force, and might have harassed
considerably any part of the 1st Corps which should attempt to molest
the capital of Estremadura. Instead of attacking the place, Victor
contented himself with sending to it vain summonses to surrender, and
with endeavouring to discover whether it might not contain traitors
ready to negotiate with King Joseph. He brought down from Madrid,
as his agent, a Spanish magistrate named Sotelo, who had become a
zealous _Afrancesado_. Through this person he addressed letters both
to the governor of Badajoz and to the Central Junta at Seville.
After setting forth all the evils which the continuance of the war
was bringing upon Spain, Sotelo stated that his king was ready to
grant the most liberal and benevolent terms to the Junta, in order
to spare further effusion of blood. The letter was duly forwarded
to Seville, where it was laid before the government. The ironical
answer was promptly returned ‘that if Sotelo possessed full powers to
negotiate for peace on the basis of the restoration of Ferdinand VII,
and the prompt evacuation of Spain by the French armies, peace would
be possible. If not, the Junta must continue to carry out the mandate
conferred upon it by the nation; according to which it could conclude
no truce or treaty except on the two conditions stated above.’ Sotelo
tried to continue the negotiation, but his offers were disregarded,
and Victor soon realized that he would obtain no further advantages
save by his sword. He remained at Merida waiting in vain for the news
of Soult’s advance on Lisbon, which was, according to Napoleon’s
orders, to be the signal for the 1st Corps to resume its advance.
N.B.--For the campaign of Medellin I have used the narratives of
Rocca and Sémélé (the latter often very inaccurate), the _Mémoires_
of Jourdan, the day-book of the Frankfort regiment of Laval’s
division, and Victor’s correspondence with King Joseph, and on the
Spanish side the dispatches of Cuesta, also two letters from D’Urban
(British attaché on Cuesta’s staff) to Cradock, and some enclosures
sent by Frere to Castlereagh.
SECTION XIII
SOULT’S INVASION OF PORTUGAL
CHAPTER I
SOULT’S PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS IN GALICIA
(JANUARY 19-MARCH 6, 1809)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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