A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Soult kept his head quarters at Orense for nine days, during which
he was busied in collecting stores of food, repairing his artillery,
whose carriages had been badly shaken by the villainous roads, and in
endeavouring to pacify the country-side by proclamations and circular
letters to the notables and clergy. In this last scheme he met with
little success; from the bishop of Orense downwards almost every
leading man had taken refuge in the hills, and refused to return.
Silence or defiant replies answered the Marshal’s epistolary efforts.
His promises of protection and good government were sincere enough;
but the commentary on them was given by the excesses and atrocities
which his troops were committing in every outlying village. It was
not likely that the Galicians would come down from their fastnesses
to surrender[214].
[214] For the bishop of Orense’s sarcastic reply see Arteche, v.
351. For the general effect of the proclamation see St. Chamans:
of the atrocities of the French, _Los Guerrilleros Gallegos_ give
ample and sometimes incredible accounts.
The general advance of the army towards Portugal had been fixed for
March 4. It was not made under the most cheerful conditions. Not
only were the neighbouring peasantry still defiant as ever, but
bad news had come from the north. An aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney,
who had struggled through to Orense in despite of the insurgents,
brought a letter from his chief, which reported that the rising had
become general throughout the province, and apparently expressed
strong doubts as to the wisdom of invading Portugal before Galicia
was subdued. The Duke of Elchingen, as it would seem, wished his
colleague to draw back, and to aid him in suppressing the bands of
the coast and the upper Minho [215]. He might well doubt whether the
6th Corps would suffice for this task, if the 2nd Corps marched far
away towards Oporto, and got completely out of touch. Soult, however,
had the Emperor’s orders to advance into Portugal in his pocket. He
knew that if he disobeyed them no excuse would propitiate his master.
Probably he was not sorry to leave to Ney the unenviable task of
dealing with the ubiquitous and irrepressible Galician insurgents.
He sent back the message that he should march southward on March 4,
and continued his preparations. This resolve was not to the liking
of some of his subordinates: many of the officers who had served
with Junot in Portugal by no means relished the idea of returning to
that country. They did not conceal their feelings, and made the most
gloomy prophecies about the fate of the expedition. It was apparently
Loison who formed the centre of this clique of malcontents: he found
many sympathizers among his subordinates. Their discontent was the
basis upon which, two months later, the strange and obscure ‘Oporto
Conspiracy’ of Captain D’Argenton was to be based. At the present
moment, however, they contented themselves with denunciations of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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