A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
being made a member of the Regency by Dalrymple, he should have
remained at Lisbon and worked with his colleagues. But returning to
his own flock, he reassumed the authority which he had possessed
during the early days of the insurrection, and pursued a policy of
his own, which often differed from that of his Regency at large, and
was sometimes in flagrant opposition to it. His position, in fact,
was similar to that of Palafox at Saragossa, and like the Aragonese
general he often practised the arts of demagogy in order to keep
firm his influence over the populace. He was all for the system of
the _levée en masse_; and summoned together unmanageable bands which
he was able neither to equip nor to control. He praised their zeal,
was wilfully blind to their frequent excesses, and seldom tried to
turn their energies into profitable channels. Indeed, he was so
ignorant of military matters himself, that he had no useful orders
to give. He ignored the advice of the Portuguese generals in his
district, and got little profit from that of two foreign officers
whom the British Government sent him--the Hanoverian General Von
der Decken and the Prussian Baron Eben. These gentlemen he seems to
have conciliated, and to have played off against the native military
authorities. But if they gave him good counsel, there are no signs in
his actions that he turned it to account. All the British witnesses
who passed through Oporto in January and February 1809, describe the
place as being in a state of patriotic frenzy, and under mob law
rather than administered by any regular and legal government[221].
The only fruitful military effort made in this part of Portugal was
that of the gallant Sir Robert Wilson, who raised there in November
and December his celebrated ‘Loyal Lusitanian Legion.’ This was
intended to be the core of a subsidiary Portuguese division in
British pay, distinct from the national army. When Wilson arrived
in Oporto the bishop welcomed him, and forwarded in every way the
formation of the corps. In a few days the Legion had 3,000 recruits
of excellent quality, of whom Wilson could arm and clothe only some
1,300, for the equipment which he had brought with him was limited.
He soon discovered, however, that the bishop’s zeal in his behalf was
mainly due to the desire to have a solid force at hand which should
be independent of the Portuguese generals. He wished the Legion to
be, as it were, his own body-guard. Sir Robert was ill pleased, and
being unwilling to mix himself in the domestic feuds of the bishop
and the Regency, or to become the tool of a faction, quitted Oporto
as soon as his men could march. With one strong battalion, a couple
of squadrons of cavalry, and an incomplete battery--under 1,500 men
in all--he moved first to Villa Real (Dec. 14), and then to the
frontier, where he posted himself near Almeida and took over the task
of observing Lapisse’s division, which from its base at Salamanca
was threatening the Portuguese border.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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