A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
still more when a little later heavy reinforcements from England
began to pour into the city. But in the last days of January and the
first of February matters at Lisbon had been in a most dangerous and
critical condition: the Regency, utterly unable to keep order, had
hinted to Sir John Cradock that he must take his own measures against
the mob, and for several days the British general had kept the
garrison under arms, and planted artillery in the squares and broader
streets--exactly as Junot had done seven months before. The ‘legions’
were cowed, and most fortunately no collision occurred: if a single
shot had been fired in anger, there would have been an end of the
Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and it is more than likely that Cradock--a
man of desponding temperament--would have abandoned the country.
[223] They were raised by a decree of Dec. 23, 1808.
[224] This was a proper precaution, as the sea-forts could be of
no use for defending Lisbon from a land attack, while, if Lisbon
got into French hands again, they would have been invaluable for
resisting an attack from the side of the sea. But Cradock was far
too precipitate in commencing an operation which betrayed such
want of confidence.
His force at this moment was by no means large: when Moore marched
for Salamanca in October he had left behind in Portugal six
battalions of British and four of German infantry[225], three
squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons (the regiment that had been so
much cut up at Vimiero), one of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the King’s
German Legion, and five batteries, only one of which was horsed.
From Salamanca, when on the eve of starting on the march to Sahagun,
Sir John had sent back two regiments to Portugal, in charge of his
great convoys of sick and heavy baggage[226]. To compensate for this
deduction from his army he had called up a brigade of the troops left
in Portugal; but only one battalion of it--the 82nd--reached him
in time to join in his Castilian campaign[227]. The net result was
that seven British infantry regiments from Moore’s army were left
behind, in addition to the four German corps. Two more had arrived
from England in November[228], and a fresh regiment of dragoons in
December[229].
[225] These were the 2/9th, 29th, 1/40th, 1/45th, 82nd, 97th,
and 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th line battalions of the King’s German
Legion.
[226] The 1/3rd and 5/60th. The last battalion was mainly
composed of foreigners, and had received more than 200 recruits
from the deserters of Junot’s army. Moore would not trust it, and
sent it back. It afterwards did splendid service under Wellesley.
[227] The battalions that did not get up in time were the 1/45th
and 97th.
[228] These were the 3/27th and 2/31st, which had sailed with
Baird from Portsmouth, but were sent on from Corunna to Lisbon
when the rest of Baird’s expedition landed in Galicia.
[229] The 14th Light Dragoons.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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