A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Considering that the old corps of officers in Portugal was
notoriously incompetent, it was hard to see how the expanded army was
to be drilled and disciplined. About 25,000 recruits were suddenly
shot into the old _cadres_; they could be readily procured, for
not only were volunteers forthcoming in great numbers, but if they
ran short a stringent conscription law was in existence. But how
were the regiments to be officered? It was true that a considerable
amount of the raw material for officers was obtainable, for patriotic
enthusiasm was driving the young men of the upper classes into the
army, in a way that had never before been seen--the service had not
hitherto been popular, owing to its poor pay and prospects. But one
cannot officer raw recruits with equally raw ensigns, and call the
result a regular army. Moreover, arms and equipment were lamentably
deficient: Junot had confiscated and destroyed almost all the store
of arms belonging to the old army: it is said that the insurgents
had not 10,000 serviceable muskets among them when Wellesley landed.
The British had distributed some 42,000 more between August and
December[248]; but what were these among so many? There were to be
over 50,000 regulars, when the establishment was completed, and
the Regency hoped to call out some 40,000 militia when the first line
of defence had been equipped, and after that to arm the vast masses
of the _Ordenanza_.
[248] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1309. Return No. 5, p. 9.
[Illustration: _Portuguese Dragoon of the 1st (Alcantara) Regiment_
_From a drawing of 1809._
_Walker & Cockerell Ph. Sc._]
The natural results followed. In obedience to the decree issued by
the Regency, a considerable number of men were collected at each
regimental dépôt. Of these about one-third, on an average, were old
soldiers: but the proportion varied, for some corps had suffered more
than others from the drafts of trained men which Junot had sent off
to France. A good many of the regiments succeeded, so far as numbers
went, in constituting their two battalions without much difficulty.
Others were less fortunate, and could only raise one: two were so
hopelessly incomplete that Beresford distributed the few hundred men
whom they could produce among other corps, and temporarily disbanded
them[249]. It was the same with the cavalry, of which two regiments
were wholly without horses, and several were so absurdly short of
mounts that they could not be used[250]. Even of the corps which
were not dissolved, several were so weak that they had not recruited
themselves up to half their nominal strength even by September[251].
This was more especially the case in the Alemtejo, where the
population displayed an apathy that contrasted strongly with the
turbulent enthusiasm prevalent in Lisbon and in the North.
[249] The 8th and 22nd, both Alemtejo regiments, were entirely
drafted off, and were raised again afresh with recruits in the
autumn.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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