A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
took kindly to their new commanders, and served them loyally and well.
[258] For notes on the difficulties and friction caused by
clashing pretensions of British and Portuguese seniority in rank,
see _Wellington Dispatches_, vol. iv. pp. 368-81, 394-5, and
several other letters to Castlereagh and Beresford.
[259] Largely from the 1/3rd foot. See _Wellington Dispatches_,
vol. iv. p. 463. Other regiments also contributed.
In the beginning Beresford’s reorganization only extended to the
regiments in Lisbon and the south. Those stationed beyond the Douro
were already in the field, and actively engaged with Soult. They had
hardly received any assistance, either of officers or of arms and
equipment, before they became involved in the campaign of March,
1809[260]. In fairness to them this must be borne in mind, when their
conduct in battle is compared with that of the reorganized army in
the following year. The Portuguese Regency, in their report on the
Oporto campaign sent to their Prince on May 31, 1809, pleaded with
truth ‘that the armies formed in the northern provinces were motley
assemblies, whose numbers and good will bore witness to the zeal of
the people, and their determination not to accept the French yoke,
but which could not with any propriety be called regular troops.
They were composed of incomplete and fractional regiments, and the
larger proportion of the rank and file consisted of recruits, many
of whom had not been a month under arms. Some of the corps were
short of muskets: those which had them were armed with weapons of bad
quality[261], and various calibre. All were deficient in the most
essential articles of equipment. It was not fair to expect that such
troops could oppose with any prospect of success a well-armed and
well-disciplined veteran army like that of France[262].’
[260] A few British officers had arrived, such as Col. Patrick
who commanded the 12th of the line in Silveira’s army.
[261] Some of the muskets sent by the British were in the hands
of the Oporto troops, but none had reached the Tras-os-Montes
regiments of Silveira’s army.
[262] All this is analysed from the Portuguese historian Da Luz
Soriano.
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