A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Abaxo on the left, and Outeiro on the right bank, of the Tamega.
Soult halted three days at Monterey in order to allow his rearguard
and his convoy of sick to close up with the main body. But on March
10 he resumed his advance, using the two parallel roads on the two
banks of the Tamega. Franceschi’s light horse and Heudelet’s division
pushed down the eastern side, Caulaincourt’s brigade of dragoons[271]
and Delaborde’s infantry down the western side of the river. Merle
and Mermet were still near Verin. As the Tamega was unfordable in
most places, the army seemed dangerously divided, but Soult knew well
that he was running little or no risk. Both at Feces and Outeiro the
Portuguese detachments, which covered Silveira’s main body, tried to
offer serious resistance. They were of course routed, with the loss
of a gun and many prisoners.
[271] Of Lahoussaye’s division.
On hearing that his enemy was drawing near, Silveira ordered
his whole army to retreat behind Chaves to the position of San
Pedro[272]. This command nearly cost him his life; the ignorant
masses of militia and _Ordenanza_ could only see treason in the
proposed move, which abandoned the town to the French. The local
troops refused to march, and threatened to shoot their general:
he withdrew with such of his men as would still obey orders, but
a mixed multitude consisting of part of the 12th regiment of the
line (the Chaves regiment), and a mass of _Ordenanza_ and militia,
remained behind to defend the dilapidated town. Its walls had never
been repaired since the Spaniards had breached them in 1762; of
the fifty guns which armed them the greater part were destitute of
carriages, and rusting away in extreme old age; the supply of powder
and cannon-balls was wholly insufficient for even a short siege. But
encouraged by the advice of an incompetent engineer officer[273], who
said that a few barricades would make the place impregnable, 3,000
men shut themselves up in it, and aided by 1,200 armed citizens,
defied Soult, and opened a furious fire upon the vedettes which he
pushed up to the foot of the walls. The Marshal sent in a fruitless
summons to surrender, and then invested the place on the evening of
the tenth; all night the garrison kept up a haphazard cannonade,
and shouted defiance to the French. Next morning Soult resolved
to drive away Silveira from the neighbouring heights, convinced
that the spirits of the defenders of Chaves would fail the moment
that they saw the field army defeated and forced to abscond. The
divisions of Delaborde and Lahoussaye soon compelled Silveira to
give ground: he displayed indeed a laudable prudence in refusing to
let himself be caught and surrounded, and made off south-eastward
towards Villa Real with 6,000 or 7,000 men. The Marshal then summoned
Chaves to surrender for the second time; the garrison seem to have
tired themselves out with twelve hours of patriotic shouting, and to
have used up great part of their munitions in their silly nocturnal
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account