A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Wilson’s reasons for moving forward were partly political,
partly military: on the one hand he wished to get away from the
neighbourhood of the Bishop of Oporto, whose intrigues disgusted
him; on the other he saw that it was necessary to bring up a force
to cover the frontier of Portugal, when Moore marched forward into
Spain. As long as Moore had remained at Salamanca, there was a strong
barrier in front of Portugal: but when he departed it was clear that
the kingdom must defend itself. Wilson therefore advanced to Pinhel,
near Almeida, and there established his little force in cantonments.
He was at this place when the startling developments of the campaign
in the last ten days of December, 1808, took place. Moore retired on
Galicia, Napoleon’s army swept on into Leon, and Wilson found himself
left alone with the whole defence of the north-eastern frontier
of Portugal thrown on his hands. He soon heard of the storming of
Zamora and Toro, and learnt that Lapisse’s division had arrived at
Salamanca. Three marches might bring that general to the border.
A few days later Wilson received from Sir John Cradock the news that
he had ordered the British garrison to evacuate Almeida[301], and
to retire on Lisbon, as the whole remaining force in Portugal would
probably have to embark in a few days. The new commander-in-chief
added that he should advise Wilson to bring off his British officers
and depart with the rest, as the Portuguese would be unable to make
any head against Bonaparte, and it would be a useless sacrifice
to linger in their company and be overwhelmed. This pusillanimous
counsel shocked and disgusted Wilson: he called together his
subordinates, and found that they agreed with him in considering
Cradock’s advice disgraceful. They resolved that they could not
desert their Portuguese comrades, and were in honour bound to see
the campaign to an end, however black the present outlook might
appear[302].
[301] It consisted of the 45th and 97th regiments.
[302] Napier, who is very friendly to Cradock, makes no mention
of this extraordinary dispatch. But it is fully substantiated by
Mayne and Lillie, who were both present at Wilson’s council of
war, and heard the matter discussed. See their _History of the
Lusitanian Legion_, p. 43.
When therefore the British garrison of Almeida was withdrawn, Wilson
entered that fortress with the Legion and took charge of it. He
obtained from the Regency leave to appoint his lieutenant-colonel,
William Mayne, as the governor, and also received permission to
assume command of the local levies in the neighbourhood. These
consisted of the skeletons of two line regiments (nos. 11 and 23)
whose reorganization had but just begun. There were also two militia
regiments (Guarda and Trancoso) to be raised in the district, but at
this moment they existed only in name, and possessed neither officers
nor arms. For immediate action Wilson could count upon nothing but
the 1,300 men of the Lusitanian Legion.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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