A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
[304] This fact comes from a letter of Ramon Blanco, governor
of Ciudad Rodrigo, dated Jan. 13, which Frere sent home to
Castlereagh, and which is therefore now in the Record Office.
Blanco complains that he is absolutely without trained
artillerymen of any sort.
[305] Carlos d’España, whose name we shall so frequently meet
during the succeeding years, was no Spaniard, but a French
_émigré_ officer of the name of D’Espagne. Englishmen, on account
of his name, sometimes took him for a prince of the Spanish royal
family.
[306] Sir Robert Wilson to Frere, dated Jan. 29, in the Record
Office. The regiment sent by Pignatelli was called ‘Volunteers of
Avila.’
With this small assistance, Wilson, whose total force never exceeded
400 horse and 3,000 infantry, kept Lapisse employed throughout
February and March. He beat up the French quarters on several
occasions, and twice captured large convoys of provisions which
were being directed on Salamanca; to fall upon one of these, a
great requisition of foodstuffs from Ledesma, he dashed far within
Lapisse’s lines, but brought out all the wagons in safety and
delivered them to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. At last, emboldened
by his adversary’s timidity, he extended his right beyond the Sierra
de Francia, and established part of the Legion under Colonel Mayne in
the Puerto de Baños, the main pass between Salamanca and Estremadura.
Thus Lapisse was completely cut off from all communication with
Victor and the French army on the Tagus, save by the circuitous route
through Madrid.
Jourdan, writing in the name of King Joseph, had duly transmitted to
Lapisse the Emperor’s orders to march on Abrantes, the moment that
it should be known that Soult had arrived at Oporto. He had even
reiterated these directions in February, though both he and the King
doubted their wisdom. Victor had written to Madrid to suggest that
Alcantara would be a much better and safer objective for the division
to aim at than Abrantes[307]. He wished to draw Lapisse’s troops
(which properly belonged to the 1st Corps) into his own sphere of
operations, and repeatedly declared that without them he had no hope
of bringing his Estremaduran campaign to a happy end, much less of
executing any effective diversion against Portugal. Jourdan agreed
with him, opining that Lapisse would miscarry, if he invaded central
Portugal on an independent line of operations. But no one was so
convinced of this as Lapisse himself, who, with his exaggerated ideas
of the strength of Wilson, was most reluctant to move forward. As
late as the end of March the Emperor’s orders were still ostensibly
in vigour[308], and the general only excused himself for not
marching, by pretending that he could not venture to advance till he
had certain news of Soult’s movements. This the Galician insurgents
were obliging enough to keep from him.
[307] Victor to King Joseph, from Toledo, Feb. 3, 1809.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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