A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
All the ten guns in the Portuguese batteries, five standards, and
several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the victorious
French, who lost (it is said) no more than two killed and seven
wounded. Their good fortune had been extraordinary: without the
opportune fog which hid their advance, their preliminary operations
would probably have been discovered. If their explosion had done
a little more or a little less than was hoped, the bridge might
have been totally destroyed, or its barricades left practically
uninjured--either of which chances would have foiled Bouchard’s plan.
But the luck of the army of Portugal was still in the ascendant, and
all went exactly as had been intended.
Thus the Tamega was passed, and Silveira decisively beaten: his
levies had fled in all directions, and Soult opined that it would
take a long time to rally them. The day after the fight Loison
was joined at Amarante by Heudelet’s division from Braga, which,
in obedience to the Marshal’s orders, had marched to join the
expeditionary force, leaving only a single battalion behind to hold
Viana. This was an unfortunate move, as on Heudelet’s departure the
_Ordenanza_ came down from the Serra de Santa Catalina, and overran
the district which had been evacuated, in spite of Lorges’ dragoons,
who had been directed to keep the roads clear after the infantry had
been withdrawn.
Meanwhile there were far more troops at Amarante than were needed
for the pursuit of Silveira, so Soult called back to Oporto the
division of Delaborde, leaving to Loison the infantry of Heudelet
and Sarrut, with Lahoussaye’s two brigades of dragoons, a force of
about 7,000 men. He ordered his lieutenant to scour the country as
far as Villa Real, and to send reconnaissances on the roads toward
Chaves and Braganza, with the object of frightening the insurgents
to retreat as far as possible. But Loison was not to advance for
more than two days’ march into the Tras-os-Montes, for rumours were
beginning to arrive concerning the appearance of British troops in
the direction of Coimbra, and the Marshal wished to keep his various
divisions close enough to each other to enable them to concentrate
with ease. If there were any truth in the news from the south, it
would be dangerous to allow a force which formed a third of the
whole army of Portugal to go astray in the heart of the mountains
beyond the Tamega. Loison accordingly marched off on May 8 towards
Villa Real, which he occupied without meeting with resistance. He
learnt that Silveira and his regulars had crossed the Douro, and gone
off in the direction of Lamego; but Botilho had fled up the Tamega
towards Chaves, and the _Ordenanza_ were lurking in the hills. He
then returned to Amarante, where we may leave him, at the end of his
tether, while we describe the state of affairs in Oporto.
SECTION XIII: CHAPTER VI
INTRIGUES AT OPORTO: THE CONSPIRACY OF ARGENTON
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