A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
[328] Napier’s conclusions as to Soult’s conduct are wholly
warped by his strong predilection for the Marshal--which dated
back to the time when the latter dealt kindly with his wounded
brother on the day after Corunna. He understates Soult’s
encouragement of the movement, and will have us believe that
it was purely the work of the Portuguese. He omits all mention
of Ricard’s circular, and finally suppresses all mention of
Napoleon’s angry upbraidings except the following (ii. p. 75):
‘The Emperor wrote to Soult that the rumour had reached him,
adding, with a delicate allusion to the Marshal’s previous
services, “I remember nothing but Austerlitz.”’ Now it was not
a _rumour_ which had reached Schönbrunn, but a copy of Ricard’s
circular, which the Emperor quotes _verbatim_. Therefore Napoleon
was writing with tangible evidence, not with camp reports,
to guide him. How far Napier’s sentence above gives a fair
impression of the tone of the dispatch which I have reproduced,
I leave the reader to judge. It was a surprise to myself when I
put the two together. Once and for all, it must be remembered
that Napier can never be trusted when Soult is in question--the
Marshal’s intrigues, his greed, his shameful plundering of
Andalusian churches, are all concealed.
There can be no doubt that the Duke of Dalmatia might have put a
stop to all the activity of his Portuguese friends by merely raising
his hand. It would have sufficed for him to assure the deputations
which visited him that his duty as the lieutenant of the Emperor
forbade him to listen to their proposals. He could have caused
the proclamations to be torn down, and have silenced the street
orators. ‘They could not have made him king against his own will,’
as one of his officers remarked[329]. But no action of the kind
was taken; and the movement was openly encouraged. The Marshal’s
explanation, that he was only taking the best means in his power to
build up a French party in Oporto, will not stand examination. Why
should the scheme involve his own promotion to the throne, if his
views were disinterested, and his actions merely intended to serve
his master’s ends? Is it conceivable that the Portuguese should, of
their own accord, and without any suggestion from without, have hit
upon the idea of crowning a conqueror whose very name was strange
to them three weeks before, and whose hands were red with the blood
of thousands of their fellow countrymen? Clever and cautious though
the Marshal was, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he
had for once allowed his ambition to take the bit between its teeth,
and to whirl him off into an enterprise that was worthy of the most
hair-brained of adventurers.
[329] Fantin des Odoards, p. 220.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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