A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Accordingly on November 20 Wellington declared his intention of
withdrawing his army--save one single division--to the north of the
Tagus, and of placing it at various points in the province of Beira,
so as to cover all the practicable roads to Lisbon from the side
of Old Castile. On the twenty-sixth he sent formal notice of his
intentions to Seville, well knowing the storm of indignation that
would be roused thereby. At the same time he advised the Junta to
reinforce Albuquerque’s army of Estremadura with troops drawn from
Del Parque, adding that to keep Albuquerque well to the front, in his
present positions at Almaraz and Arzobispo, was the best means of
protecting the western approaches of Andalusia. Del Parque’s corps,
whose reason for existence was the ‘containing’ of the French troops
in Old Castile, would be able to spare troops to strengthen the
army of Estremadura, because the English host, in its new position,
would be behind it, and opposed to the forces under Kellermann and
Marchand, which had hitherto had nothing in their front but the ‘Army
of the Left.’ Moreover, it would be an appreciable relief to Del
Parque, who was finding the greatest difficulty in feeding his army
in the thinly-peopled mountain region between Ciudad Rodrigo and
Bejar, to be freed from the burden of maintaining one or two of his
five divisions.
The Junta, as might have been expected, took Wellington’s
determination to remove from Badajoz with the worst of graces. They
could hardly have failed to do so, when one of his main reasons for
departing, barely concealed in his dispatches to them, was his fear
of getting involved in their operations, and his reluctance to place
his troops in line with the Spanish armies. Nor could they have
been expected to agree with his strategical view that Lisbon, not
Cadiz, would be the main objective of the grand advance of the French
armies, when the spring should come round. To every man or body of
men their own possible dangers naturally seem more imminent and more
interesting than those of their neighbours. The departure of the
English from Badajoz was formally announced to the Junta on November
26, and began to be carried out on December 8, when the brigade of
Guards marched for Portalegre, and was followed on successive days by
the other brigades of the army. By the 24th of December Wellington
and his staff alone were left in the Estremaduran fortress, and next
day his head quarters were at Elvas, across the frontier. The second
division, under Hill, halted at Abrantes, where Wellington intended
to leave it, as the nucleus of a covering force which was to guard
Lisbon from any possible attack from the south side of the Tagus. The
rest of the army pursued its way across the mountains of Beira, and
by January 3, 1810, head quarters were at Coimbra, and the main body
of the British troops was beginning to take up billets in the small
towns of the valley of the Mondego.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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