A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
When considering the action of the French after the victory of
Ocaña, it is necessary to remember that King Joseph and Soult were
not in the position of ordinary invaders, who have just succeeded in
demolishing the last army of their enemy. In wars of a normal type
the victor knows that the vanquished will sue for terms when further
resistance appears hopeless; he proceeds to dictate the cessions of
territory or payments of indemnities that he thinks proper, as the
price of peace. But it was not a profitable treaty which Napoleon
desired: he had put it out of his own power to end the war in such a
fashion, when he declared his brother King of Spain. For him there
was no Spanish government in existence save that which he had set up
at Madrid: the Central Junta, and the Cortes when it should meet,
were mere illegal assemblies, with which he could not deign to enter
into negotiations. It was now perfectly clear that the Spaniards
would never submit of their own accord. Their position in December
1809, desperate as it might be, was no worse than it had been in the
March of the same year. Areizaga’s army had suffered no more at Ocaña
than had those of Cuesta and Cartaojal nine months before, on the
disastrous fields of Medellin and Ciudad Real. Indeed, there were
probably more men actually in line to defend Andalusia in December
than there had been in April. Moreover, in the early spring Soult had
been in the full career of conquest in Portugal, and nothing save
Cradock’s insignificant force appeared to prevent his onward march
to Lisbon. At mid-winter, on the other hand, the flank of Andalusia
was covered by Wellington’s victorious army, and by the reorganized
Portuguese host of Beresford. If the Junta had refused to listen to
the insidious advances of Sotelo in April[113], there was no reason
to suppose that it would lend a ready ear to any similar advocate of
submission in December. Indeed, its every action showed a resolve to
fight out the losing game to the end.
[113] See vol. ii. pp. 168-9.
Joseph Bonaparte would never be King of Spain till every province was
held down by French bayonets. Not only must each corner of the land
be conquered, but after conquest it must be garrisoned. For, where
there was no garrison, insurrection burst out at once, and the weary
process of pacification had to be repeated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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