A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The activity of the guerrilleros did not merely constitute a military
danger for King Joseph. It affected him in another, and an equally
vexatious, fashion, by cutting off nearly all his sources of revenue.
While the open country was in the hands of the insurgents, he could
raise neither imposts nor requisitions from it. The only regular
income that he could procure during the later months of 1809 was
that which came in from the local taxes of Madrid, and the few other
large towns of which he was in secure possession. And save in the
capital itself, his agents and intendants had to fight hard with the
military governors to secure even this meagre pittance[115]. The
King could not command a quarter of the sum which he required to pay
the ordinary expenses of government. His courtiers and ministers,
French and Spanish, failed to receive their salaries, and the Spanish
army, which he was busily striving to form, could not be clothed
or armed, much less paid. Nothing vexed Joseph more than this: he
wished to make himself independent of his brother’s generals, by
raising a large force of his own, which should be at his personal
disposition. He formed the _cadre_ of regiment after regiment, and
filled them with deserters from the foreign troops of the Junta, and
with any prisoners who could be induced to enlist under his banners
in order to avoid transportation to France. But the recruits, when
sent to join the new regiments, disappeared for the most part within
a few weeks. Joseph thought that it was from lack of pay and proper
sustenance, and raged at the idea that, but for the want of money,
he might have at his disposition a formidable army of his own. But he
deceived himself: the ‘juramentados’ had for the most part no desire
save to desert and rejoin their old colours: the real renegades were
few. In the ranks of the Junta’s army the soldier was even worse
clothed, fed, and paid than in that of Joseph. No amount of pampering
would have turned the King’s Spanish levies into loyal servants.
[115] For a typical example of the relations of French governors
and the King’s officials see Thiébault’s account of his quarrel
with Amoros in his autobiography, iv. 350-5. Cf. Miot de Melito,
chapters xi-xii of vol. ii.
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