A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Almeida and Elvas, Peniche and Abrantes, were regular fortresses with
large garrisons. There were, however, other points where Wellington
ordered fortifications of a less permanent kind to be thrown up,
because he thought them of first-rate strategical importance. The two
most important were one on the northern line of advance which the
French might take, the other on the central or Castello Branco line.
The first was a line of redoubts behind the river Alva, just where it
joins the Mondego, on either side of the bridge and village of Ponte
de Murcella. It was here, he thought, that Masséna would choose his
road, along the south bank of the Mondego, if he marched on Lisbon
by the Beira line. But the Marshal moved by Vizeu, partly (as it
seems) because he had heard of the fortifications of this defile, and
the works were never used. Equally unprofitable (so it chanced) was
another important series of field-works, constructed to cover the
lowest reach of the Zezere against an invader who should come by the
Castello Branco road, and should have masked or taken Abrantes. This
was a line of redoubts and trenches, almost a fortified camp, on the
east bank of the river from Tancos to opposite Martinchel, blocking
both the roads which lead from Castello Branco into Estremadura.
Masséna, coming not by the route which was guarded against, but from
Leiria and Thomar, took the lines of Zezere in the rear, and they
proved useless.
Along with the precautions taken on the banks of the Alva and the
Zezere, two other pieces of engineering must be mentioned. The one,
the destruction of the _Estrada Nova_,--the mountain-road which leads
from Fundão and Belmonte to the lower Zezere without passing through
Castello Branco,--has already been noticed, when we were dealing
with the possible lines of invasion in Portugal. The other move was
constructive, not destructive, in character. Foreseeing that Abrantes
might be masked, or besieged on the northern bank of the Tagus, and
all the roads in that direction thereby blocked, while it might
still be very profitable to have free communication between Lisbon
and the Castello Branco region, he caused the road above the south
bank of the Tagus, from opposite Abrantes to the flying-bridge at
Villa Velha, to be thoroughly reconstructed. This route, by Gavião
and Niza, was so much easier in its slopes than the old high-road
Abrantes-Castello Branco, that, even when the latter was safe, troops
moving from east to west, along the Tagus often used it during the
next two years of the war, though it involved two passages of the
river instead of one.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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