A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
[231] Napoleon to Clarke, Oct. 30, 1809.
[232] See for example Jan. 20, 1810, to Berthier; Jan. 31, to
same; Feb. 12, to same.
[233] _Correspondance_, vol. xx, Napoleon to Berthier, Feb. 12,
1810.
Meanwhile the third great unit which was to form part of the
projected Army of Portugal, the 2nd Corps (under the temporary
command of General Heudelet[234]), was taking part in a separate and
remote series of operations, far to the South. This corps, it will be
remembered, had been left on the Tagus about Talavera and Oropesa,
to protect the rear of Soult and King Joseph, when they marched
in January with the 1st, 4th, and 5th Corps to conquer Andalusia.
That exploit having been accomplished, Mortier went, with half of
the 5th Corps, to attack Badajoz, and to subdue Estremadura, which
Soult imagined to be defenceless, since Albuquerque had marched
with the old Estremaduran army to save Cadiz. Mortier advanced
unopposed to the walls of Badajoz, which he reached on February 12,
but found himself unable to undertake its siege with his small force
of 9,000 men, because a new Spanish host had just appeared upon
the scene. La Romana, with three of the divisions of the army that
had been beaten at Alba de Tormes in November, had marched down the
Spanish-Portuguese frontier by the Pass of Perales; and on the same
day that Mortier appeared in front of Badajoz, his vanguard arrived
at Albuquerque, only twenty miles away. These divisions were 13,000
strong: La Romana could add to this force a few thousands more left
behind by Albuquerque. Mortier rightly felt that he dare not commence
the regular siege of Badajoz when he had such superior numbers in
his front. He therefore asked for reinforcements, both from Soult
and from King Joseph. The former could spare nothing from Andalusia
at this moment, but the 2nd Corps was ordered to leave the Tagus
and place itself in communication with Mortier. Heudelet had other
projects on hand at the moment: he had just seized Plasencia on
February 10, and was engaged in bickering with Carlos d’España and
Martin Carrera, whom La Romana had left in the Sierra de Gata. But,
in obedience to his orders, he called in his detachments, and marched
by Deleytosa and Truxillo into the valley of the Guadiana. This
movement, from the French point of view, was a hazardous one; by the
transference southward of the 2nd Corps, a long gap was left between
Ney at Salamanca and Heudelet and Mortier in Estremadura. No troops
whatever covered Madrid from the side of the south-west and the
valley of the Tagus, and an irruption of the English on this line was
one of the dangers which Napoleon most dreaded[235]. He was unaware
of Wellington’s deeply-rooted determination to commit himself to no
more Spanish campaigns.
[234] Soult had given up the 2nd Corps when he became King
Joseph’s Major-General: Reynier, appointed to command it, had not
yet appeared.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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