A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
would advance along the high-road to the south of the Mondego, where
he intended to stand at bay on the Alva, behind the entrenchments of
Ponte de Murcella.
The main point of interest at this moment was the movements of
the French 2nd Corps, which still lay in cantonments at Zarza and
Coria in front of Hill. Guarda being no longer held in force, it
was clear that Hill could not safely join the main army by the
road Atalaya-Fundão-Guarda, if Reynier moved up by the Pass of
Perales to Alfayates and Sabugal. Wellington began an anxious daily
correspondence with Hill, giving him a new line of march by Sobreira
Formosa, Villa d’el Rei and Espinhal, for his junction, but ordering
him to be sure that he did not move till Reynier had thoroughly
committed himself to the transference of his whole force to the north
of the Sierra de Gata. For it would be disastrous if feints should
induce the British detaining force to leave Villa Velha and Abrantes
uncovered, and Reynier should turn out to have selected them as his
objective, and to be meditating an invasion along the Castello Branco
line[327]. It was even possible, though not likely, that Masséna
might bring up the 6th and 8th Corps to join Reynier, instead of
bringing Reynier across the mountains to join them[328]. But every
contingency had to be provided against, the unlikely ones as well as
the likely. As a corollary to Hill’s march, that of Leith had also
to be arranged; he must wait at Thomar till it was certain that the
2nd Corps had moved, but the moment that certainty was obtained, must
march for Ponte de Murcella, and join the main army, if the French
had gone north, but support Hill on the Castello Branco road if they
had taken the other, and less probable, course.
[327] See Wellington to Hill of Aug. 31, Sept. 1, Sept. 4, Sept.
6. The Commander-in-Chief was much worried by a false rumour that
Reynier was already in force at Sabugal on Aug. 31, and then by
an equally false one that the whole 2nd Corps had marched south
towards the Tagus, and was about to cross it near Alcantara (see
the letter to La Romana of Sept. 6). As a matter of fact, Reynier
made no definite move from Zarza till Sept. 10, though he had
made feints, in both the directions indicated, with small forces.
[328] That this possibility was in Wellington’s mind is shown
by the letter to La Romana of Sept. 6, from Gouvea, in which he
writes, ‘Vous aurez appris les mouvements du corps de Regnier de
la part du Général Hill. Ou l’ennemi va faire le mouvement sur
notre droite (dont je vous ai écrit) ou il va faire le siège de
Badajoz. On dit que du canon a passé d’Almeida à Sabugal, et de
là vers Regnier, mais je ne sais pas si c’est vrai, ou si c’est
du canon de siège.... Vous savez ce qu’il faut faire si on se met
entre nous deux, en passant le Tage à Villa Velha, ou au-dessous
de la jonction.’
NOTE ON ALMEIDA AND THE BRIDGE OF THE COA
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