the struggle for independence, in order to obtain the opportunity of dealing with the American question. [137] See below, section xxxiii, page 337. The idea, however, was in the air. This was the time at which King Joseph made his last attempt to open up secret negotiation with the patriots. His own condition was unhappy enough, as has been sufficiently shown in an earlier chapter: but he was well aware that the outlook of his enemies was no less gloomy. One of the numerous--and usually impracticable--pieces of advice which his brother had sent him was the suggestion that he should assemble some sort of a Cortes, and then, posing as a national king, try to open up communications with the Cadiz government, setting forth the somewhat unconvincing thesis that Great Britain, and not France, was the real enemy of Spanish greatness. The idea of calling a Cortes fell through: the individuals whom Joseph could have induced to sit in it would have been so few, so insignificant, and so unpopular, that such a body could only have provoked contempt[138]. But an attempt was made to see if anything could be done at Cadiz: the inducement which Joseph was authorized to offer to the patriots was that immediately on his recognition as a constitutional king by the Cortes--and a constitution was to be drawn up in haste at Madrid--the French army should retire from Spain, and the integrity of the realm should be guaranteed. Napoleon even made a half-promise to give up Catalonia, though he had practically annexed it to his empire in the previous year[139]. [138] For all this scheme see the Memoirs of Miot de Melito, iii. pp. 215-16, beside the Emperor’s own dispatches. Note especially the instructions which the French ambassador, Laforest, was to set before Joseph. [139] See vol. iv. p. 215.