A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, MadridOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
[160] Liverpool to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii.
p. 257.
Here the jealousies and bickerings in London may be left for a space.
We shall only need to turn back for a moment to ministerial matters
when, at midsummer, the whole situation had been transformed, for
France and Russia were at last openly engaged in war, a great relief
to British statesmen, although at the same time a new trouble was
arising in the West to distract their attention. For the same month
that started Napoleon on his way to Moscow saw President Madison’s
declaration of war on Great Britain, and raised problems, both on
the high seas and on the frontiers of Canada, that would have seemed
heart-breaking and insoluble if the strength of France had not been
engaged elsewhere. But the ‘stab in the back,’ as angry British
politicians called it, was delivered too late to be effective.
SECTION XXXII
WELLINGTON’S FIRST CAMPAIGN OF 1812
CHAPTER I
THE CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO
It is with no small relief that we turn away from the annals of the
petty warfare in the provinces and of the bickerings of politicians,
to follow the doings of Wellington. All the ‘alarms and excursions’
that we have been narrating were of small import, compared with the
operations on the frontiers of Portugal and Leon which began at the New
Year of 1812. Here we have arrived at the true backbone of the war, the
central fact which governed all the rest. Here we follow the working
out of a definite plan conceived by a master-mind, and are no longer
dealing with spasmodic movements dictated by the necessities of the
moment. For the initiative had at last fallen into Wellington’s hands,
and the schemes of Soult and Marmont were no longer to determine his
movements. On the contrary, it was he who was to dictate theirs.
The governing factor in the situation in the end of December 1811 was,
as we have already shown, the fact that Marmont’s army had been so
distracted by the Alicante expedition, undertaken by Napoleon’s special
orders, that it was no longer in a position to concentrate, in full
force and within a reasonably short period of time. It was on December
13th[161] that the Duke of Ragusa received the definitive orders,
written on November 20-1, that bade him to send towards Valencia, for
Suchet’s benefit, such a force as, when joined by a detachment from
the Army of the Centre, should make up 12,000 men, and to find 3,000
or 4,000 more to cover the line of communications of the expedition.
Accordingly orders were issued to Montbrun to take up the enterprise,
with the divisions of Foy and Sarrut, and his own cavalry; the
concentration of the corps began on December 15th, and on December 29th
it marched eastward from La Mancha[162] on its fruitless raid.
[161] For this date see Marmont to Berthier, from Valladolid,
Feb. 6, 1812.
[162] For details, see chapter iii of section xxx above.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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