The garrison found it impossible either to repair the breaches or to clear away the débris which had fallen from them. All that could be done was to commence retrenchments and inner defences behind them. This was done with some effect at the great breach, where cuts were made in the ramparts on each side of the demolished section, parapets thrown up behind the cuts, and two 24-pounders dragged into position to fire laterally into the lip of the easy slope of débris which trended up to the ruined wall. At the second or smaller breach much less was accomplished--the warning was short, for it had never been guessed that this tower was to be battered, and the space upon which work could be done was very limited. It was hoped that the narrowness of the gap might be its protection--it was but a seam in the wall compared with the gaping void at the first and greater breach. [Illustration: CIUDAD RODRIGO] On the morning of the 19th the fire was recommenced, with some little assistance from the two guns which had now begun to work from the advanced battery in the second parallel. The breaches continued to crumble: that at the tower looked as easy in slope (though not nearly so broad) as that at the original point of attack, and an incessant fire all day kept the enemy from making any repairs. No more could be done for the breaches, wherefore Wellington ordered that some of the siege-guns should turn their attention to silencing the French fire from the remoter points of the northern wall. Several of their guns were dismounted: but even by dusk there were many still making reply. There was now nothing to prevent the assault from being delivered, since it had been settled that no attempt was to be made to sap up nearer the walls, or to blow in the counterscarp. Wellington wrote his elaborate directions for the storm sitting under cover in a trench of one of the advanced approaches, to which he had descended in order to get the closest possible view of the fortress[187]. [187] Jones’s _Sieges_, i. p. 137. The orders were as follows. The chosen time was seven o’clock, an hour sufficiently dark to allow the troops to get forward without being seen as they filled the trenches, yet soon enough after nightfall to prevent the French from doing any appreciable repairs to the breaches under cover of the dark. The main assaults were to be delivered by the 3rd Division on the great breach, and by the Light Division on the lesser breach. There were also to be two false attacks delivered by small bodies of Portuguese troops, with the purpose of distracting the attention of the besieged to points remote from the main assault: either of them might be turned into serious attempts at escalade if the circumstances favoured.