Such being Napoleon’s views at midwinter, it is strange to find Napier asserting that the disasters of the French at this time were caused partly by the jealousies of his lieutenants, partly by their failing to understand his orders in their true spirit, so that they neglected them, or executed them without vigour[210]. Without denying that Marmont, Dorsenne, and Soult were jealous of each other, we may assert that the real fundamental origin of all their disasters was that their master persisted in directing the details of the war from Paris, founding his orders on data three weeks old, and sending those orders to arrive another fortnight or three weeks after they had been written. As a fair example of what was perpetually happening we may cite the following dates. Wellington started to move on January 1st, 1812, as Thiébault wrote to Dorsenne (on the report of a Spanish spy) on January 3rd: on January 27 the general information that the Anglo-Portuguese army had crossed the Agueda, without any details, reached the Emperor, and caused him to dictate a dispatch for Dorsenne, giving him leave to detain the two divisions of the Imperial Guard under orders for France, and to support Marmont with them: the Emperor added that he hoped that by January 18th Montbrun would be nearing Madrid, and that by the end of the month his column would have joined the Army of Portugal. Eight days _before_ this dispatch was written Ciudad Rodrigo was already in Wellington’s hands: the news of its fall on January 19th seems to have reached Paris on February 11th[211], whereupon, as we shall presently see, the Emperor dictated another dispatch to Marmont, giving elaborate instructions on the new condition of affairs. This (travelling quicker than most correspondence) reached Marmont at Valladolid on February 26[212]: but of what use to the Marshal on that day were orders dictated upon the basis of the state of affairs in Leon on January 19th? ‘On ne dirige pas la guerre à trois ou quatre cents lieues de distance,’ as Thiébault very truly observed[213]. [210] _Peninsular War_, iv. p. 134. [211] Correspondence in King Joseph’s _Letters_, viii. pp. 306-7. [212] See Marmont’s letter acknowledging its receipt in his _Correspondance_, iv. pp. 342-3. [213] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 554. It was precisely Napoleon’s determination to dictate such operations as Montbrun’s Alicante expedition, or the transference of Marmont’s head-quarters from the valley of the Tagus to Valladolid, without any possible knowledge of the circumstances of his lieutenants at the moment when his orders would come to hand, that was the fatal thing. With wireless telegraphy in the modern style he might have received prompt intelligence, and sent directions that suited the situation. But under the conditions of Spain in 1812 such a system was pure madness.