A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, MadridOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
‘The Emperor regrets that when you had the division of Souham and three
others united [i. e. on January 23] you did not move on Salamanca, to
make out what was going on. That would have given the English much
to think about, and might have been useful to Ciudad Rodrigo. The
way to help the army under the present circumstances is to place its
head-quarters at Salamanca, and concentrate your force there, detaching
one division to the Tagus valley and also reoccupying the Asturias.
[This concentration] will oblige the enemy to remain about Almeida and
in the North, for fear of an invasion of Portugal. You might even march
on Rodrigo, and, if you have the necessary siege artillery, capture the
place--your honour is bound up with it. If want of the artillery or
of food renders it necessary to put off such an operation, you could
at least make an incursion into Portugal, and advance towards the
Douro and Almeida. This menace would keep the enemy “contained”....
Your posture should be offensive, with Salamanca as base and Almeida
as objective: as long as the English know that you are in strength
at Salamanca they will not budge: but if you retire to Valladolid
yourself, and scatter divisions to the rear, and above all if you have
not got your cavalry effective by the time that the rainy season ends,
you will expose all the north of Spain to misfortunes.
‘It is indispensable to reoccupy the Asturias, because more troops are
needed to hold the edge of the plain as far as Biscay than to keep down
that province. Since the English are divided into two corps, one in the
South and the other opposite you, they cannot be in heavy strength: you
ought to outnumber them greatly.... I suppose that you consider the
English mad, for you believe them capable of marching against Badajoz
when you are at Salamanca, i. e. of allowing you to march to Lisbon
before they can get back. They will only go southward if you, by your
ill-devised schemes, keep two or three divisions detached on the Tagus:
that reassures them, and tells them that you have no offensive projects
against them.
‘To recapitulate, the Emperor’s intentions are that you should stop at
Salamanca, that you should reoccupy the Asturias, that your army should
base itself on Salamanca, and that from thence you should threaten the
English.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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