A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, MadridOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The Portuguese troops left to defend the northern frontier were all
militia, with the exception of a couple of batteries of artillery and
the cavalry brigade of regulars which had been with Wellington in Leon
during the autumn, under Madden, but was now transferred to Silveira’s
charge, and set to watch the frontier of the Tras-os-Montes, with the
front regiment at Braganza. Silveira in that province had the four
local regiments of militia, of which each had only one of its two
battalions actually embodied. Baccelar had a much more important force,
but of the same quality, the twelve regiments forming the divisions
of Trant and J. Wilson, and comprising all the militia of the Entre
Douro e Minho province and of northern Beira. Three of these regiments
were immobilized by having been told off to serve as the garrison of
Almeida. Farther south Lecor had under arms the two militia regiments
of the Castello Branco country, watching their own district. The total
force of militia available on the whole frontier must have been about
20,000 men of very second-rate quality: each battalion had only been
under arms intermittently, for periods of six months, and the officers
were for the most part the inefficient leavings of the regular army. Of
the generals Silveira was enterprising, but over bold, as the record of
his earlier campaigns sufficiently demonstrated--Trant and Wilson had
hitherto displayed equal energy and more prudence: but in the oncoming
campaign they were convicted of Silveira’s fault, over-confidence.
Baccelar passed as a slow but fairly safe commander, rather lacking in
self-confidence.
Wellington’s very interesting memoranda divide the possibilities
of March-April into three heads, of which the last contains three
sub-sections:--
(1) Marmont may, on learning that Badajoz is in danger, march with
practically the whole of his army to succour it, as he did in May-June
1811. If this should occur, Abadia and Carlos de España will advance
and boldly take the offensive, laying siege to Astorga, Toro, Zamora,
Salamanca, and other fortified posts. Silveira will co-operate with
his cavalry and infantry, within the bounds of prudence, taking care
that his cavalry, which may support Abadia, does not lose communication
with, and a secure retreat upon, his infantry, which will not risk
itself.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account