On the 4th the breaches, both in the Trinidad and in Santa Maria, looked practicable--on the morning of the 5th they were certainly so. But the question was raised as to whether the mere practicability of the breaches was enough to ensure success--it was clearly made out that the garrisons were building a semicircular inner retrenchment among the houses of the town, which would cut off the breaches, and give a second line of resistance. Moreover Colonel Fletcher, who was just out of bed, his wound of the 19th March being on the mend, reported from personal observation that it was clear that all manner of obstacles were being accumulated behind both breaches, and every preparation made for a desperate defence of them. Wherefore Wellington ordered the storm to be put off for a day, and turned two batteries on to a new spot, where Spanish informants reported that the wall of the curtain was badly built, between Santa Maria and the Trinidad. So true was this report, that a very few hours battering on the morning of the 6th made a third breach at this point, as practicable as either of the others. To prevent the enemy from getting time to retrench this third opening into the town, the storm was ordered for 7.30 o’clock on the same evening--it would have been well if the hour had been kept as first settled. SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER IV THE STORM OF BADAJOZ. APRIL 6, 1812 The arrangements which Wellington made for the assault--a business which he knew would be costly, and not absolutely certain of success--were as follows.