A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, MadridOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Soult, therefore, was justified in his wrath when he wrote to Marmont
that he had been given a promise and that it had been broken, ‘if there
had been the least attempt to concert operations between the armies of
Portugal and the South, the English army would have been destroyed, and
Badajoz would still be in the power of the Emperor. I deplore bitterly
the fact that you have not been able to come to an arrangement with me
on the subject.’ But the wrath should have been directed against the
Emperor, not against his lieutenant, who had so unwillingly been forced
to break his promise. The only censure, perhaps, that can be laid upon
Marmont is that he should have made it more clear to Soult that, by
the new directions from Paris, he was rendered unable to redeem his
pledge. Soult was not, however, without warnings that something of the
kind might happen: Berthier had written to him on February 11th, and
the letter must have arrived by the middle of March, that the Emperor
was displeased to find him appealing for troops of the Army of Portugal
to be moved to Truxillo, and that he ought to be more dependent on his
own strength[300]. It would have been better if the Emperor’s trusty
scribe had explained to Soult that Marmont was expressly forbidden, in
a dispatch written that same day, to keep more than one division on the
Tagus, or to worry himself about the danger of Badajoz.
[300] Berthier to Soult, Feb. 11. The same date as the fatal
dispatch sent to Marmont, who was given a copy of that to Soult
as an enclosure.
Marmont’s original plan for joining Soult via Almaraz might have
failed--he himself confesses it in one of his replies to Berthier. But
it was the only scheme which presented any prospect of success. By
making it impossible Napoleon rendered the fall of Badajoz certain. For
it is no defence whatever to point out that his dispatch of March 12th,
which reached Salamanca on March 27, finally gave Marmont the option
of going southward. By that time it was too late to try the move:--if
the Duke of Ragusa had marched for Almaraz and Truxillo next morning,
he would still have been many days too late to join Soult before April
6th, the date on which Badajoz fell.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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