[326] 5th and 17th from Elvas, 22nd from Abrantes. The movement of the army marching against Marmont was rapid and continuous, though it might have been even more swift but for the fact that the whole long column had to pass the bridge of Villa Velha, the only passage of the Tagus that lay straight on the way to the Lower Beira: to send troops by Abrantes would have cost too much time. On the 16th the Light and 3rd Divisions crossed the bridge, on the 17th some cavalry and Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, while the 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions were now close to the river at Castello de Vide and Alpalhão, and only the 1st was rather to the rear at Portalegre[327]. Alten’s German Hussars, picked up at Castello Branco on the 18th by the head of the column, were the only cavalry which Wellington showed in his front. This was done on principle: Marmont knew that this regiment was in his neighbourhood, and if it pressed in upon his outposts, it told him nothing as to the arrival of new troops opposite him. As we have already seen, when quoting one of his dispatches[328], he drew the inference that Wellington intended, and so late as the 22nd believed that his adversary’s main army was still behind the Tagus, and that at most two divisions had come up to Villa Velha--but probably no further. [327] All these movements are taken from the elaborate tables in D’Urban’s Journal for these days. [328] See above, p. 288. Steadily advancing, the column, with the 3rd and Light Divisions leading, reached Castello Branco on the 17th. They found that it had been reoccupied on the 15th by Alten’s Hussars and Le Cor’s militia; but it was in a dreadful state of dilapidation owing to the ravages of Clausel’s troops during the two days of their flying visit. Clear information was received that Marmont was still at Sabugal, and his vedettes lay as far south as Pedrogão. The British staff were in hopes that he might be caught. ‘His ignorance (as we hope) of the real force in march against him may end in his destruction,’ wrote D’Urban to Charles Stewart on the 18th, ‘for he has put the Agueda in his rear, which the late rains have made impassable: his situation is very critical. If he discovers his error at once, he may get off by his left down the Perales road, and so reach Plasencia: but if he does not, and waits to be _driven_ out of the ground he holds, I don’t see how he is to get away. Lord Wellington will be all closed up by the 21st; meanwhile he shows little to his front, and avoids giving serious alarm: the fairest hopes may be entertained of a decisive blow[329].’ [329] Letter in the D’Urban Papers.