So ended the day; the loss of the Spaniards was not very heavy in killed and wounded--about 1,000 it is said, mainly in Lardizabal’s and Zayas’s divisions--for the others did not stand to fight. But of prisoners they lost 4,641, including 230 officers and the two wounded cavalry brigadiers. Miranda’s division contributed the largest proportion to the captives, though Zayas lost 400 men of the Walloon battalion, and Lardizabal a still greater number out of his weak division of 3,000 bayonets[37]. Twelve guns were left behind, seven captured in the hard fighting in the right centre, five from O’Donnell’s easily-routed divisions. The French casualties are given by Suchet at about 130 killed and 590 wounded--probably an understatement, as the regimental returns show 55 officers hit, which at the ordinary rate of casualties should imply over 1,000 rank and file disabled. As a commentary on the fighting, it may be remarked that Chlopiski and Robert, in dealing with Obispo, O’Donnell, and Mahy, had only 7 officers _hors de combat_, while Harispe and Habert lost 41 in the real fight with Zayas and Lardizabal[38]. [37] 2nd of Badajoz (two battalions) was almost exterminated, losing 17 officers, 21 sergeants, and 500 men, ‘mostly prisoners,’ out of 800 present. See its history in the Conde de Clonard’s great work on the Spanish army. [38] The 16th Line (three battalions) alone, in fighting Zayas, lost just double as many officers as the seven battalions of Chlopiski and Robert in their engagement with Mahy, Miranda, and Villacampa! The actual losses in action were not the worst part of the battle of Saguntum--the real disaster was the plain demonstration that the Valencian troops could not stand even against very inferior numbers. It was to no purpose that the two gallant ‘Expeditionary Divisions’ had sacrificed themselves, and lost one man in three out of their small force of 5,500 men in hard fighting. They had been betrayed by their worthless associates on the left. Blake’s generalship had not been good--he dispersed his columns in the most reckless way, and kept no sufficient reserves--but with the odds in his favour of 27,000 men to 14,000, he ought yet to have won, if the larger half of his army had consented to fight. They did not: with such troops no more could be hoped from further battles in the open field--whatever the numerical odds might be. They could at most be utilized behind walls and entrenchments, for purely passive defence. And this, as we shall see, was the deduction that their general made from the unhappy events of October 25.