Montbrun’s raid was clearly a misguided operation. Alicante was far too strong to be taken by escalade, when it was properly garrisoned: the only chance was that the garrison might flinch. They refused to do so, and the French general was left in an absurd position, demonstrating without siege-guns against a regular fortress. His action had two ill-effects--the first was that it concluded the Valencian campaign with a fiasco--a definite repulse which put heart into the Spaniards. The second (and more important) was that it separated him from Marmont and the Army of Portugal for ten days longer than was necessary. His chief had given him orders to be back on the Tagus by the 15th-20th of January, as his absence left the main body too weak. Owing to his late start he would in any case have overpassed these dates, even if he had started back from Almanza on January 13th, after receiving the news of the fall of Valencia. But by devoting nine days to an advance from Almanza to Alicante and then a retreat from Alicante to Albacete, he deferred his return to Castile by that space of time. He only reached Toledo on January 31st with his main column. Foy’s division, sent on ahead, arrived there on the 29th. Montbrun’s last marches were executed with wild speed, for he had received on the way letters of the most alarming kind from Marmont, informing him that Wellington had crossed the Agueda with his whole army and laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo. The Army of Portugal must concentrate without delay. But by the time that Montbrun reached Toledo, Rodrigo had already been twelve days in the hands of the British general, and further haste was useless. The troops were absolutely worn out, and received with relief the order to halt and wait further directions, since they were too late to save the fallen fortress. It is fair to Montbrun to remark that, even if he had never made his raid on Alicante, he would still have been unable to help his chief. If he had turned back from Almanza on January 13th, he would have been at Toledo only on the 22nd--and that city is nearly 200 miles by road from Ciudad Rodrigo, which had fallen on the 19th. The disaster on the Agueda was attributable not to Montbrun’s presumptuous action, but to the Emperor’s orders that the Army of Portugal should make a great detachment for the Valencian campaign. Even if the raiding column had started earlier, as Napoleon intended, it could not have turned back till it got news of the capitulation of Blake, which only took place on January 8th. And whatever might then have been its exact position, it could not have been back in time to join Marmont in checking the operations of Wellington, which (as we have already stated) came to a successful end on January 19th. Wherefore, though Montbrun must receive blame, the responsibility for the fall of Rodrigo lay neither with him nor with Marmont, but with their great master.