A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Hence came his final decision to retreat by easy marches toward the
strong positions about Salamanca, leaving the offensive to the enemy,
and granting them the opportunity of uniting their two long-separated
armies. Wellington’s own plea in favour of this resolve must be
quoted--‘The two corps of this army, particularly that which has been
in the North, are in want of rest. They have been continually in the
field, and almost continually marching, since the month of January
last; their clothes and equipments are much worn, and a period in
cantonments would be very useful to them. The cavalry likewise are weak
in numbers, and the horses rather low in condition. I should wish to
be able to canton the troops for a short time, and I should prefer the
cantonments on the Tormes to those farther in the rear. I do not know
exactly what the force of the enemy is. The Army of Portugal have about
36,000 men, of which 4,000 is cavalry[145]. The Army of the North have
10,000 men, of which 1,200 is cavalry. It is hard to judge of the exact
extent of Soult’s force. It is reported that the enemy brought from
Valencia to the Tagus from 40,000 to 45,000 men, but I should consider
this to be rather below the number that the Armies of Andalusia and the
Centre could bring up, without any troops from the Armies of Aragon and
Valencia[146]. Soult is particularly strong in good cavalry, and there
are several more regiments in the Army of the Centre. It will remain
to be seen what number of troops can be brought to operate against our
position (on the Tormes): as unless Madrid should be again abandoned to
its fate by the King, he must make arrangements to resist the attacks
which Elio and the guerrilleros (the Empecinado, El Medico, &c.) will
make on that city, even if General Ballasteros should not move forward
in La Mancha. I propose therefore to wait at present on the Tormes,
till I shall ascertain more exactly the extent of the enemy’s force. If
they should move forward, I can either bring the contest to a crisis on
the positions of San Christoval, or fall back to the Agueda, according
to what I shall at the time consider to be best for the cause[147].’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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