A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Making allowance alike for the difficulties of the Regency, and the
irritation of the much-worried general, it seems fair to say that on
the one hand Wellington was right in denouncing jobbery and urging
administrative reforms, but that on the other hand no such reforms,
however sweeping, would have sufficed to make both ends balance in
the revenue of the exhausted kingdom of Portugal. The task was too
heavy--but the eighteenth-century slackness and corruption, which
still survived in too many corners of the bureaucracy, made it even
heavier than it need have been. It is probable that Wellington’s
palliatives would have failed to make receipts meet expenditure,
however hardly the screw might have been turned. But a levy of 10 per
cent. on commercial profits does not look very heavy to the taxpayer of
1921!
This is a military not an economic or a financial history; it is
unnecessary to go further into Portuguese problems. The main thing to
be remembered is that they bulked large in the correspondence of the
harassed chief, who sat writing minutes on all topics, civil no less
than strategical, in his desolate head-quarters at Freneda.
SECTION XXXV: CHAPTER III
WELLINGTON AND WHITEHALL
The position which Wellington had won himself by five years of
successful campaigning in the Peninsula was such as no British
commander since Marlborough had enjoyed. His reputation was now
European; his views, not merely on the Spanish struggle but on the
general politics of the Continent, had to be taken into consideration
by the Ministry. He was no longer an officer to whom orders could be
sent, to be carried out whether he liked them or not. He had become
a political personage, whose views must be ascertained before any
wide-reaching decision as to the struggle with Napoleon was taken.
In 1813 it is not too much to say that he exercised a determining
influence not only on the military policy of Britain, but on the whole
course of the Great War: as we shall presently see, the triumph of
Vittoria had the most marked and direct effect on the action of Russia,
Prussia, and Austria. But even before Vittoria he had asserted his will
in many ways--he had stopped some projects and approved others. The
factious resignation of his brother Lord Wellesley from the Perceval
Cabinet had not impaired his position, nor had the coming into office
of Lord Liverpool, when Perceval perished by the bullet of a crazy
assassin a month after the fall of Badajoz. Wellington’s correspondence
with the War Minister, Lord Bathurst, in 1813, is as confidential
and amicable on both sides as had been the case when the domineering
Wellesley had been in power: with the new Prime Minister, Liverpool,
there is no trace of any friction whatever--rather every sign of
reciprocal respect.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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