A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
So much may suffice to explain Wellington’s dealings during the winter
and spring of 1813 with the British Cabinet. His advice, as we have
seen, was always asked, and generally settled the problem in the way
that he desired. So much cannot be said for his dealings with the
Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards: the Duke of York seems to have
been the last person in Whitehall to recognize the commanding intellect
of the great general. Though he always wrote with perfect courtesy, he
evidently considered that his own views on the organization, personnel,
and management of the British Army were far more important than those
of the victor of Salamanca. The correspondence of Wellington with the
Duke and his Military Secretary, Colonel Henry Torrens, occupies an
enormous number of pages in the volumes of Dispatches and Supplementary
Dispatches. Torrens, an obliging man, seems to have tried to make
himself a buffer between the two contending wills, and Wellington was
conscious of the fact that he was no enemy. The subjects of contention
were many.
One of the most important was patronage. Now that he had reached the
fifth year of his command in the Peninsula, Wellington considered that
he had won the right to choose his own chief subordinates. But still
he could not get officers of tried incapacity removed from the front,
nor prevent others, against whom he had a bad mark, from being sent out
to him. When he asked for removals, he was told of ‘the difficulty of
setting aside general officers who have creditably risen to high rank’
on the mere ground that they have been proved incapable, and unfit for
their situations. But it was far worse that when he had requested that
certain generals should not be sent out, they came to him nevertheless,
despite of his definite protest; and then, when he requested that
they might be removed, he was told that he would incur odium and
responsibility for their removal. ‘What a situation then is mine! It is
impossible to prevent incapable men from being sent to the army; and
then when I complain that they have been sent, I am to be responsible!
Surely the “odium” ought not to attach to the person who officially
represents that they are not capable of filling their situations’--but
(the aposiopesis may be filled up) to the Horse Guards for sending them
out. Yet Wellington’s pen did not add the words which are necessary to
complete the sense.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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