A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
It was four months before this traitor was got rid of, though Lord
Bathurst had been shocked by the news, and corroborated it by his
own observation: he had seen mischievous letters from Gordon to the
Horse Guards, and if he wrote such stuff to the Duke it was easy
to guess what he might write to Lord Grey or Whitbread. Certain of
the newspaper paragraphs _must_ have come ‘from some intelligent
person with you[326].’ The strange way in which the removal was
accomplished was not by a demand for his degradation for misuse of his
office[327], but by a formal report to the Horse Guards that ‘Colonel
Gordon does not turn his mind to the duties to be performed by the
Quartermaster-General of an Army such as this, actively employed in
the field: notwithstanding his zeal and acknowledged talent, he has
never performed them, and I do not believe he ever will or can perform
them. I give this opinion with regret, and I hope His Royal Highness
will believe that I have not formed it hastily of an officer respecting
whose talents I, equally with His Royal Highness, had entertained a
favourable opinion[328].’ Three weeks later the Military Secretary
at the Horse Guards writes that Wellington shall have back his old
Quartermaster-General George Murray--and Gordon is recalled[329]. But
why had Gordon ever been sent? The Duke of York alone could say. The
impression which he had left as a soldier upon men at the front, who
knew nothing of his political intrigues, was exceedingly poor[330].
This was the worst trick which was played on Wellington from the
Horse Guards. Another was the refusal to relieve him of the gallant
but muddle-headed and disobedient William Stewart, who despite of
his awful error at Albuera was allowed to come out to the Peninsula
again in 1812, and committed other terrible blunders: it was he who
got the three divisions into a marshy deadlock on the retreat from
Salamanca, by deliberate and wilful neglect of directions[331]. ‘With
the utmost zeal and good intentions he _cannot_ obey an order,’ wrote
Wellington on December 6, 1812--yet Stewart was still commanding the
Second Division in 1814[332]. In letters sent to the Horse Guards
in December 1812 the Commander-in-Chief in Spain petitioned for the
departure of five out of his seven cavalry generals--which seems a
large clearance--and of ten infantry divisional and brigade commanders.
About half of them were ultimately brought home, but several were
left with him for another campaign. He had also asked that he might
have no more generals who were new to the Peninsula inflicted upon
him, because their arrival blocked promotion for deserving colonels,
to whom he was anxious to give brigades. ‘I hope I shall have no more
new Generals: they really do but little good, and they take the places
of officers who would be of real use. And then they are all desirous
of returning to England[333].’ The appeal was in vain--several raw
major-generals were sent out for the spring campaign of 1813, and we
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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