A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
On March 12th, while all the movements were in progress, another batch
of orders from Paris came to hand. They contained details which upset
the arrangements which the King was carrying out, for the Emperor
decided that the succour which was to be given to the Army of the North
was to be drawn from Reille’s Army, and not from D’Erlon’s, so that a
new series of counter-marches would have to be carried out. And--what
was more ominous for the future--Napoleon had dropped once more into
his old habit of sending orders directly to subordinate generals,
without passing them through the head-quarters of the Army of Spain.
For Clarke, in his dispatch of February 3rd, informed the King that
the Emperor had sent Reille directions to detach a division to Navarre
at once, ‘a disposition which cannot conflict with any orders which
your Majesty may give to the Army of Portugal, for the common end of
reducing to submission the provinces of the North[375].’ Unfortunately
this was precisely what such an order did accomplish, for Joseph had
sent D’Erlon in the direction to which he now found that Reille had
simultaneously detached Barbot’s division of the Army of Portugal,
without any knowledge that D’Erlon had already been detailed for the
job.
The Emperor was falling back into the practice by which he had in the
preceding year ruined Marmont--the issuing of detailed orders for the
movement of troops, based on information a month old, it being certain
that the execution of these orders would take place an additional three
weeks after they had been formulated. As we shall presently see, the
initial successes of Wellington in his Vittoria campaign were entirely
due to the position in which the Army of Portugal had placed itself, in
obedience to Napoleon’s direct instructions.
Meanwhile Clarke’s dispatch of February 2nd, conveying these orders,
arrived at the same moment as two others dated ten days later[376],
which were most unpleasant reading. The first contained an absolutely
insulting message to the King from his brother: ‘his Imperial Majesty
bids me say,’ wrote Clarke, ‘with regard to the money for which
you have asked in several recent letters, that all funds necessary
for the armies of Spain could have been got out of the rich and
fertile provinces which are being devastated by the insurgent bands.
By employing the activity and vigour needed to establish order and
tranquillity, the resources which they still possess can be utilized.
This is an additional motive for inducing your Majesty to put an end
to this war in the interior, which troubles peaceful inhabitants,
ruins the countryside, exhausts your armies, and deprives them of
the resources which they could enjoy if these fine regions were in a
peaceful state. Aragon and Navarre are to-day under Mina’s law, and
maintain this disastrous struggle with their food and money. It is time
to put an end to this state of affairs.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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